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ExEcutivE Summary
Over the past decade several developments have led to a growing emphasis 
worldwide on creating open budget systems.
 Citizens have increasingly asserted that they should know how their governments  
are using public funds and other resources of their countries.
Experts have increasingly concluded that making budgets transparent and building 
adequate checks and balances into the budget process can enhance the credibility 
and prioritization of policy decisions, limit corrupt and wasteful spending, and  
facilitate access to international financial markets.
Budget transparency has become central to a number of international development 
discourses, ranging from the financing of climate change mitigation, to country-
level actions to meet international development commitments like the Millennium 
Development Goals, to accounting for the revenues from the sale of natural  
resources, and to examining the amount of international aid given to developing 
countries and how it is spent.
3For these reasons, the international budget 
partnership created the open budget Survey.  
the Survey is the only independent and comparative 
measure of government budget practices, with its 
rigorous approach receiving substantial praise from 
international public finance experts. this report 
analyzes the third implementation of the Survey, 
which yielded four main findings.
Finding 1: The overall state of budget transpar-
ency is poor. Only a modest minority of coun-
tries can be considered to have open budgets 
while a large number of countries provide 
grossly insufficient budget information.
The average Open Budget Index (OBI) score for 
the countries surveyed in 2010 is 42 out of 100 (see 
the text box on the next page for a description of 
the “OBI” and the chart at the end of this summary 
for each country’s score). Specifically:
ɆɆOnly 20 of the 94 countries included in the 
Open Budget Survey 2010 had OBI scores above 
60 and can be characterized as providing their 
citizens with enough budget data to enable 
them to develop a comprehensive analysis and 
understanding of their national budgets.
ɆɆAbout one-third of the countries (33) provide 
some information, scoring between 41 and 60, 
though this information is far less than what is 
required to obtain a clear understanding of the 
budget and to provide a check on the executive.
ɆɆIn a plurality of countries (41), the amount of 
information provided is acutely inadequate. 
This includes 19 countries in which only mini-
mal information is provided (those with scores 
between 21 and 40), as well as 22 countries in 
which little to no budget information is provided 
(those with scores of 20 or less). The 22 countries 
are Algeria, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Chad, China, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, 
Fiji, Honduras, Iraq, Kyrgyz Republic, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Vietnam.
ɆɆIn 21 of the 22 countries that provide little to 
no budget information, the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal — arguably the government’s most im-
portant policy document — is not even released.1
Even when budget documents are made public, 
essential information is often absent. Only 17 of 
the countries examined, for instance, provide 
comprehensive budget information on policies 
intended to alleviate poverty. Another 41 countries 
provide no information on extra-budgetary funds in 
their Executive’s Budget Proposals even though, on 
average, extra-budgetary funds account for nearly 
40 percent of central government expenditures in 
transitional and developing countries.
Countries performing poorly on the OBI tend to 
share certain characteristics — such as low levels 
of income, low levels of democracy, geographi-
cal location in Africa and the Middle East, and 
dependence on aid and revenues from the sale of 
1   One other country — which is not in this group — that fails to publish 
its budget proposal is Afghanistan. It receives an OBI 2010 score of 21.
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hydrocarbons. These characteristics, however, 
are not necessarily deterministic of budget trans-
parency. Countries that have the political will to 
become more transparent can make meaningful 
improvements relatively quickly.
Finding 2: The general trend toward open 
budgets is nonetheless favorable. Budget 
transparency is improving substantially, es-
pecially among countries that provided little 
information in the past.
The series of Surveys (2006, 2008, and 2010) record 
substantial, and sometimes dramatic, improvements 
in budget transparency practices over the past four 
years. When the 40 countries for which there are 
comparable data for 2006, 2008, and 2010 are ex-
amined, the average OBI score goes from 47 in the 
2006 Survey to 56 in the 2010 Survey, an increase 
of nearly 20 percent in a relatively short period.
Progress has been particularly notable among 
several countries that previously performed very 
poorly on the OBI and are generally regarded as 
challenged by poverty and instability. The average 
OBI score for the 14 countries that performed worst 
in the OBI 2006 (and for which comparable data 
is available) has gone up from 25 to 40 in the OBI 
2010. Notable improvers include Egypt, Mongolia, 
and Uganda. Similar improvements were also found 
in some of the countries assessed for the first time 
in the OBI 2008, including Afghanistan, Liberia, 
and Yemen. 
Some of these governments — especially those that 
scored very low in earlier rounds of the OBI — largely 
achieved these improvements by taking one basic 
and inexpensive step: they began to make available 
on their websites the budget documents that they 
previously produced but had made available only 
to internal government audiences or to donors. In 
many cases, these governments began to publish 
their Executives’ Budget Proposals. For example, 
the Liberian and Yemeni governments published 
their budget proposals for the first time in 2009. 
the open budget  
Survey and the open 
budget index
The International Budget Partnership’s 
(IBP) Open Budget Survey assesses the 
availability in each country of eight key 
budget documents, as well as the compre-
hensiveness of the data contained in these 
documents. The Survey also examines the 
extent of effective oversight provided by 
legislatures and supreme audit institutions 
(SAI), as well as the opportunities avail-
able to the public to participate in national 
budget decision-making processes. 
The Open Budget Survey is not a perception 
survey or an opinion poll. The Survey uses 
internationally accepted criteria to assess 
each country’s budget transparency and 
accountability. The Survey is compiled 
from a questionnaire completed for each 
country by independent budget experts 
who are not associated with the national 
government. Each country’s question-
naire is then independently reviewed by 
two anonymous experts who also have no 
association to government. 
Scores assigned to certain Open Budget 
Survey questions are used to compile ob-
jective scores and rankings of each coun-
try’s relative transparency. These scores 
constitute the Open Budget Index (OBI).
5Significant changeS in OBi ScOreS ShOw 
that imprOvementS are happening
The Table below shows a lisT of all counTries whose obi scores increased by more Than 10 poinTs from 2006-2010. 
counTry 2006 2008 2010
AfghAnistAn NA 8 21
AngolA 5 4 26
ArgentinA 40 56 56
AzerbAijAn 30 37 43
CroAtiA 42 59 57
egypt 19 43 49
georgiA 34 53 55
ghAnA 42 50 54
indiA 53 60 67
liberiA NA 3 40
MAlAwi NA 28 47
MongoliA 18 36 60
norwAy 72 80 83
russiA 47 58 60
rwAndA NA 1 11
sri lAnkA 47 64 67
turkey 42 43 57
ugAndA 32 51 55
VietnAM 3 10 14
yeMen NA 10 25
Even governments that did not score very low in 
earlier rounds of the OBI achieved improvements 
by increasing the comprehensiveness of their pub-
lished budget reports, especially the Executive’s 
Budget Proposal.
The IBP’s initial investigation of what caused these 
changes suggests that a range of factors can lead 
to an increase in budget transparency, including:
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ɆɆchanges in government officials after elections 
that result in a new government or the appoint-
ment of a new official committed to greater 
transparency;
ɆɆpressure within a country from civil society 
organizations and legislatures;
ɆɆexternal factors like pressure exerted by donors 
and from specific initiatives like the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the OBI, 
and technical assistance provided to countries.
These hard-won gains in budget transparency 
should not, however, be taken for granted. The 
Survey also found that for each of the eight key 
budget documents, some countries moved in the 
wrong direction — i.e., they either stopped pub-
lishing these documents or began to provide less 
information in the published documents than in 
previous years. For example, Fiji no longer pub-
lishes its Pre-Budget Statement, Year-End Report, 
or Audit Report. The Executive’s Budget Proposal 
could not be accessed by the OBI researcher in 
Niger while in the previous round of the survey 
the OBI researcher was able to access a hard copy 
of this document from the government.
Finding 3: Budget engagement by the audit 
institutions and the legislature is typically 
weak and is strongly correlated to the lack of 
budget information made available to these 
institutions and the public.
The Open Budget Survey 2010 finds that budget 
oversight is weak in a significant number of coun-
tries assessed. Legislatures in such countries often 
do not have adequate powers to amend the budget 
developed by the executive and are not provided 
sufficient time to comprehensively assess the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal before approving it 
into law. In only 27 countries do legislatures have 
unlimited powers to amend the budget presented 
to them. In 22 countries, legislators are provided 
with the Executive’s Budget Proposal less than six 
weeks before the start of the budget year. In the 
implementation of the budget in 52 countries, the 
legislature does not have the power to prevent the 
executive from moving funds between administra-
tive units, essentially ignoring legislative intentions.
The Survey finds that supreme audit institutions 
(SAIs) generally have some of the independence 
required for them to play a useful role in the bud-
get process. Still, many lack the full independence 
from the executive that is desirable, and half re-
port that they do not have sufficient resources to 
effectively undertake their audit mandates. The 
2010 Survey also reveals that the overall strength 
of SAIs is relatively weak. Among all 94 countries 
in the 2010 Survey, the average score for questions 
assessing the strength of SAIs was just 49 of 100, 
up slightly from 2008.
Notable is the strong correlation between a country’s 
score on the OBI and the adequacy of its oversight 
institutions. Countries that perform well on the 
OBI tend to have the strongest legislatures and 
SAIs, and countries performing poorly typically 
suffer from weak oversight institutions. This cor-
relation is not surprising in that countries that 
provide more information on their budgets enable 
better oversight, and thus we are likely to find 
stronger, more effective oversight institutions in 
these contexts.
Finding 4: There are many simple steps to 
opening up budgets that governments are 
failing to undertake. Such steps can be taken 
by the executive branch, the legislature, and 
the supreme audit institutions alike.
In certain respects, improving a country’s budget 
system can be a complex, technical task. It can re-
quire creating new data systems or producing new 
reports for which the lack of technical expertise 
can be a barrier. But the Survey finds that budgets 
around the world can be opened up considerably if 
countries start with some relatively simple actions.
7Most notably, governments are producing a sur-
prisingly large number of documents for internal 
purposes or for their donors that they are not 
publishing. Of the budget documents that surveyed 
governments fail to publish, 42 percent are in fact 
produced but only used for internal purposes.
The differences between countries falling in differ-
ent OBI categories when it comes to making public 
the documents that are produced are quite large. 
Most dramatically, the high scoring countries (OBI 
scores between 81 and 100) publish 100 percent 
of the documents they produce while the worst 
scoring countries (OBI scores between 0 and 20) 
do not make public the majority of budget docu-
ments produced.
The SAIs and legislatures are not using their existing 
legal authority to the fullest. SAIs typically score 
much lower on OBI questions assessing the com-
prehensiveness of their published Audit Reports 
than they do on those assessing their independence. 
This suggests that, even given their institutional 
limitations, SAIs could publish more information in 
their audit reports. SAIs can also do more to involve 
the public, for example, through establishing fraud 
hotlines or other systems to solicit suggestions 
that can be used to determine their audit agendas.
Legislatures in only 26 countries provide the public 
with formal opportunities to provide testimony 
during budget discussions. More disturbing is that 
in 35 countries, all discussions about the budget 
between the legislatures and the executive, in-
cluding hearings, are entirely closed to the public 
(including the media), and no public record of 
such meetings is subsequently provided. In other 
words, legislatures themselves are often following 
practices that do not enable public understanding 
and participation, even though most legislatures 
could do more to foster engagement within their 
legal powers, such as holding public hearings.
recommendations
Specific recommendations for individual 
countries can be found in the separate reports 
for each country. Here are the IBP’s general 
recommendations.
1. Countries should make public all of the eight 
key budget documents they already produce: 
This simple step would require virtually no addi-
tional effort or cost by the governments involved 
but would dramatically improve the openness of 
budgets in large parts of the world, particularly 
in low-scoring countries where the majority of 
budget documents produced are not made public.
2. Budget documents should be widely avail-
able for free and on a timely basis: 
It is relatively easy to make budget documents 
widely available for free if governments simply 
publish them on their websites. Further, those 
governments that have already begun to publish 
information on their websites should use easily 
downloadable formats and develop an archive 
system for prior years’ budget reports. Countries 
should also make hard copies of budget docu-
ments available in national and local libraries and 
in information desks maintained in government 
offices. In addition, the publication of budget 
documents should be timely. For instance, the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal should be published 
well in advance of the budget approval dates, so that 
adequate review and discussion are possible, and 
Year-End and Audit Reports should be published 
within six months of the end of the fiscal year to 
be most relevant.
3. The lowest performing countries on the 
OBI should work to meet certain minimum 
standards: 
The IBP recommends that, at the very minimum, 
countries that currently provide no or scant bud-
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get information publish their Executive’s Budget 
Proposal, Enacted Budget, and Audit Reports. The 
IBP also recommends that legislatures in these 
countries begin to organize public budget hear-
ings prior to approval of the budget. The budget 
transparency practices in these countries are of 
biggest concern to the IBP and we will be monitor-
ing developments in their budgeting practices over 
the next two years and reporting on their progress 
even before the release of the next OBI.
4. Countries providing minimal or some infor-
mation should improve their performance on 
three key reports: 
The 52 countries that score between 21-60 on the 
OBI should increase the comprehensiveness of 
the Executive’s Budget Proposal, which, though 
published by almost all countries, lacks essential 
information. They should both improve the com-
prehensiveness of Audit Reports and be sure to 
publish them (currently a third of these countries 
do not publish Audit Reports). They also need to 
begin to produce and publish Mid-Year Reviews, 
which countries in this category are typically not 
publishing.
5. The authority, independence, and capac-
ity of budget oversight institutions should be 
strengthened. The voice of the public should be 
allowed as a complementary check and balance: 
Legislatures should have amendment powers, 
time to review the budget, and authority to influ-
ence changes in the budget once it is enacted, and 
SAIs should be independent and have adequate 
authority, capacity, and resources to fulfill their 
oversight responsibilities. To promote effective 
public participation, the legislature should convene 
open public hearings at each stage of the budget 
process and should allow civil society to provide 
testimony. Similarly, the public should be provided 
with opportunities to engage directly with SAIs in 
the evaluation phase of the budget process. There 
are many mechanisms, such as “fraud hotlines,” 
for such engagement.
6. Donors should encourage and support 
aid-dependent countries to improve their 
transparency: 
Donors should strongly encourage budget transpar-
ency in the countries to which they provide aid by 
offering incentives to countries that demonstrate 
better budget transparency practices. Donors should 
also make certain that the general aid they provide is 
adequately reflected in recipient countries’ budget 
documents and that they themselves provide full 
and accessible information about any project aid 
they provide. Donors also could provide technical 
assistance to increase the capacity of oversight 
institutions (legislatures, SAIs, civil society, me-
dia, etc.) to pressure executives to expand budget 
transparency and accountability.
7. A movement to push for a global norm on 
budget transparency should be established: 
The alarming state of budget transparency docu-
mented by successive rounds of the Open Budget 
Survey — coupled with evidence that progress is 
possible — constitutes a compelling case for a ma-
jor push from the international community for a 
global norm on budget transparency. Legislatures, 
SAIs, and governments (especially those that are 
committed to budget transparency) along with 
donors, professional associations on public finance 
management, and civil society organizations should 
all be involved. A budget transparency norm can 
codify broadly accepted principles and guidelines 
of appropriate government conduct with respect 
to transparency and public participation in the 
budget process. It is also important to note that 
the establishment and ratification of a global norm 
would provide civil society and legislatures with a 
powerful tool to leverage greater openness in their 
country’s budget systems.
Taken together, progress on the above recommen-
dations would be consistent with the right of the 
public to know their government’s priorities and 
would improve the collection and expenditure of 
government funds. •
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the importance of  
open budgets
A few years ago, Kheema Ram, a young man from 
rural India, was troubled by the poor quality of 
wheat being sold in government-run food shops 
in his community under the public distribution 
system. He suspected corruption within the shops, 
which sell essential food supplies at subsidized 
rates to the poor. After the officials responsible 
for the shops ignored complaints from the local 
community, Kheema Ram decided to investigate, 
which led him to analyze reports on the shops 
produced by state government auditors. Kheema 
Ram’s suspicions were confirmed by the audit re-
ports, which identified many irregularities in the 
operation of these shops and recommended that 
action be taken against the officials responsible. 
Despite these findings, the government had taken 
no action. Kheema Ram publicized the conclusions 
from the audit reports together with information 
on other irregularities he had found. The resulting 
public outcry caused the district administration 
to take action — and several shop officials were 
eventually suspended from their jobs.
In 2008 Fundar, a civil society organization (CSO) 
in Mexico, collaborated with other CSOs to launch 
an online database on farm subsidies in Mexico, 
which provides quick and easy access to govern-
ment data about “who gets what” from the country’s 
agricultural subsidy programs. The farm subsidy 
database brought to light a key problem: the way 
in which the funds were distributed. Though many 
chaptEr OnE: 
Introduction & 
Methodology
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farm subsidy programs claim to target the 
neediest farmers, in reality a small group of 
wealthy farmers had captured the vast ma-
jority of subsidy funds over time (the top 10 
percent of recipients — mostly rich farmers 
— had received over 50 percent of the funds). 
Armed with this evidence, Fundar was able to 
raise these issues and create a public debate 
about farm subsidy policy at a time when 
the global food crisis was already prompting 
questions about it. Responding to the public 
debate, the Mexican government implemented 
important reforms to cap individual payments 
and increase the amount provided to the 
smallest farmers. Public officials responsible 
for program operations have been questioned 
formally in the Mexican Senate, and several 
have been removed from office. The govern-
ment also has begun to implement measures 
designed to regain control over the distribution 
of these funds, ensuring that program funds 
reach the targeted beneficiaries.2
These examples from India and Mexico dem-
onstrate how the public and CSOs can use 
information available through open budget 
practices to improve public service delivery 
and public resource management. Access to 
budget information can be especially critical to 
poor and disadvantaged communities. These 
communities typically rely on government 
services, but their voices are often ignored 
by those in power.
These examples also begin to illustrate how 
transparency and public participation are 
the cornerstones of effective and accountable 
government. Without access to information, 
legislators, auditors, CSOs, media, and the 
broader public cannot participate effectively in 
decision making, nor can they hold the execu-
tive to account for the use of public resources. 
2   The Fundar example will be published on the IBP’s website 
as part of a series of case studies on the impact achieved by 
civil society groups that are monitoring government budgets.
Box 1. 
testing Citizen Access to 
budget data on the Millen-
nium development goals
In 2010 a coalition of civil society organizations 
around the world put access to budget infor-
mation to the test by submitting the same six 
questions to their national governments. The 
information requests sought practical budget 
data about how much governments are invest-
ing in key interventions related to fulfilling 
the Millennium Development Goals, such as 
maternal health and environmental protection. 
The requests also asked how much the govern-
ments either receive or donate in international 
development aid. 
Researchers in 80 countries submitted letters to 
their Ministries of Health, Finance, Environment, 
and other government agencies, diligently follow-
ing up on their initial requests when responses 
were not provided. After seven months and over 
1,000 letters, phone calls, and visits to ministries, 
only one country, New Zealand, provided budget 
information that substantively responded to all 
six questions. The remaining 79 governments 
either ignored the requests, refused to provide 
an answer, failed to respond to some of the 
questions while answering others, or provided 
only some of the budget data requested when 
responding to questions. 
This exercise demonstrates the difficulties citi-
zens face in accessing budget data from their 
governments and makes a strong argument for 
governments to proactively publish compre-
hensive, timely, and useful budget information. 
ɆɆ  For more information and country results, please visit 
www.internationalbudget.org. 
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Transparency and public participation, in turn, 
can enhance the credibility of policy choices and 
the effectiveness of policy interventions. Lack of 
transparency can lead to the selection of unpopu-
lar and inappropriate programs and corrupt and 
wasteful spending.
In addition to its impact on governance, budget 
transparency can benefit countries financially. 
Studies have shown that countries that have more 
transparent budgets tend to have better access to 
international financial markets and lower borrow-
ing costs. Conversely, in at least some countries 
(like Greece), a lack of transparency and effective 
oversight of the vulnerability of government debt 
and deficits to external shocks contributed to the 
recent economic crisis.
Expanded budget transparency is also essential to 
monitoring progress toward the achievement of 
international development commitments, such as 
the United Nations’ (UN) Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). Recently, the International Budget 
Partnership (IBP) and its partners requested spe-
cific budget information from 80 governments on 
MDG-related spending and resources from aid. 
The IBP and its partners obtained very little of the 
budget data they sought (see Box 1). Indeed, there 
is no requirement for governments to systemati-
cally report this information to the UN as part of 
the MDG process. But without access to such basic 
budget data, it is not possible for civil society, or 
even for the UN and donor organizations, to accu-
rately analyze the status of government programs 
meant to support the achievement of the MDGs.
Finally, transparency in government budgets is 
key to a number of other development and gov-
ernance discussions. While access to information 
on expenditures is especially important to these 
discussions, there is also a need for greater trans-
parency in the funds that flow into government 
treasuries.  There are several discussions taking 
place that are looking at this issue.
ɆɆThe Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative is working to expand government 
transparency regarding revenues generated 
from the sale of minerals and hydrocarbons.
ɆɆThe International Aid Transparency Initiative 
calls for transparent reporting of donor assis-
tance to recipient countries.
ɆɆDiscussions on climate change often focus on the 
funds needed to support developing countries’ 
transition to low-carbon economies, and how 
to ensure that this flow of funds is transparent.
But what happens when these funds reach national 
treasuries? Given the reach and potential impacts 
of how governments manage and oversee the use 
of public resources,the international community 
must focus urgently on budget transparency, on 
both the revenue and expenditure sides. The pro-
duction of timely, comprehensive, accurate, and 
accessible data on government budgets is a critical 
goal that needs to be on the agenda of governments, 
development institutions, and civil society. In this 
report, the IBP presents the collective steps that 
can be taken to ultimately achieve this goal. 
The Open Budget Survey
The IBP and its research partners around the 
world are committed to the idea that open budget 
systems are essential to creating free and just so-
cieties in which the public is empowered with the 
knowledge of how their government is managing 
their resources. Citizens can use this knowledge 
to hold their government to account for collecting 
and using public funds efficiently and effectively 
and to influence policies that improve the services 
they receive — and thus the quality of their lives. 
The IBP formulated the Open Budget Survey with 
this idea in mind. To promote greater openness in 
national government budgeting systems, the survey 
documents the current budgeting practices of gov-
ernments; establishes standards for transparent, 
participatory, and accountable budget systems; 
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and identifies countries in varying contexts and 
with different characteristics that are meeting or 
are on their way to meeting these standards.
The Open Budget Survey is a unique and valu-
able dataset for the following reasons:
ɆɆ it is the only independent and comparative mea-
sure of budget transparency around the world;
ɆɆ it is published regularly in two-year intervals 
and covers the same set of countries (although 
new countries are added in each round); and
ɆɆit uses internationally accepted criteria to as-
sess each country’s budget transparency and 
accountability.
The IBP’s first round of the Open Budget Survey 
examined 59 countries in 2006. A second applica-
tion of the Survey in 2008 examined 85 countries 
(including the 59 countries that were assessed in 
2006). Results from these previous surveys can be 
found on the IBP’s website at www.openbudget-
index.org. The 2010 Survey adds nine countries 
— Chile, Iraq, Italy, Mali, Mozambique, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain, and  Timór-Leste — to the 85 that 
were assessed in 2008.
The Open Budget Survey uses criteria developed 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its 
Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in its Best Practices for Budget 
Transparency, and the International Organization 
of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) in its 
Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts. 
Although the large majority of indicators used in 
the Open Budget Survey draw on these interna-
tional guidelines, it also assesses some issues that 
are not discussed — or not addressed in adequate 
detail — in the guidelines issued by the IMF, OECD 
or INTOSAI, including:
ɆɆthe extent and nature of public hearings orga-
nized by legislatures during budget discussions;
ɆɆthe extent and nature of public consultations 
undertaken by the executive when it is formu-
lating the national budget;
ɆɆwhether supreme audit institutions (SAIs) have 
formal communication mechanisms through 
which they solicit and receive complaints and 
suggestions from the public to assist in formu-
lating and conducting audit programs;
ɆɆwhether simplified budget data is available to 
the public through a Citizens Budget, summaries 
of various budget and audit reports, and budget 
glossaries, etc.; and
ɆɆthe comprehensiveness of budget data published, 
specifically on policies and programs intended 
to benefit impoverished populations.
Box 2. 
the iMF and Citizens 
budgets
Citizens Budgets were not part of any inter-
national guidelines when the Open Budget 
Survey was formulated, but the IBP nonetheless 
included them in the survey and has promoted 
them for more than a decade. In 2007 the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its 
Code on Fiscal Transparency to recommend the 
publication of simplified and popular versions 
of the official budget (i.e., Citizens Budgets). 
The IMF also developed a draft discussion 
paper that draws extensively on the IBP’s 
Open Budget Survey recommendations and 
provides guidelines on how governments can 
develop Citizens Budget reports.
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The Open Budget Survey is not an opinion or 
perceptions poll. Survey data is compiled from a 
questionnaire, which is completed for each coun-
try by independent budget experts who are not 
associated with the national government. For the 
2010 Survey these experts completed the question-
naire’s 123 multiple-choice questions based on 
the factual state of budget transparency in their 
countries as of 15 September 2009. As a result, 
national budget reports and documents published 
after this date — and any other developments in a 
country’s budgeting system or practices occurring 
after this date — are not considered in the Open 
Budget Survey 2010.
Each country’s completed questionnaire was in-
dependently reviewed by two anonymous experts 
who also had no association with government. In 
addition, the IBP invited the national government 
of 88 of the countries covered in the 2010 Survey to 
comment on the questionnaire completed for that 
country. Approximately half of these governments 
commented on their results; their comments are 
provided in the versions of the country question-
naires published on the IBP website.
IBP staff members reviewed the results for each 
country by checking the citations and comments 
provided by the researchers to justify the score for 
each question. Further, IBP staff members assessed 
the peer reviewers’ comments and the comments 
from governments (when provided within the 
requested timeframe) and determined the final 
answer in consultation with the researchers. These 
determinations were made after considering such 
factors as cross-country comparability of data and 
consistency in the assumptions used by research-
ers to answer the questions.
the open budget index
Ninety-two of the 123 questions in the Open 
Budget Survey questionnaire inquire about 
the public availability, timeliness, and com-
prehensiveness of a country’s budget reports. 
Scores assigned to these 92 questions are used 
to determine an overall transparency score for 
each country surveyed. These scores are then 
compiled to create the Open Budget Index (OBI), 
an objective ranking of each country’s relative 
level of transparency. The remaining survey 
questions assess the strength and effectiveness 
of legislatures and SAIs in each country studied.
Modern budgeting practices require governments 
to publish eight key and basic documents during 
a country’s budget year. These documents are 
the focus of the Open Budget Index and cover 
different stages in the budget cycle and provide 
information on budget plans and results.
The Eight Key Budget Documents
During budget formulation, the executive should 
issue two documents with at least a one month gap 
between them: the Pre-Budget Statement, which 
presents the assumptions used in developing the 
budget, such as the expected revenue, expenditure, 
and debt levels, and the broad allocations among 
sectors; and the Executive’s Budget Proposal, which 
presents the government’s detailed declaration of 
the policies and priorities it intends to pursue in 
the upcoming budget year, including the specific 
allocations to be made to each ministry and agency.
The Enacted Budget is the legal document that 
authorizes the executive to implement the policy 
measures the budget contains. The Enacted Budget 
is issued by the legislature after it approves (some-
times with amendments) the budget proposal 
presented to it by the executive.
There are two review documents that governments 
should publish during the course of budget execu-
tion. First, the executive should issue monthly or 
quarterly In-Year Reports on revenues collected, 
expenditures made, and debt incurred. Second, 
the executive should publish a Mid-Year Review for 
the first six months of the budget year to discuss 
	 InternatIonal	Budget	PartnershIP16
Box 3. 
greece’s debt Crisis 
and its budget process
Inadequacies in Greece’s budget system con-
tributed to its recent debt crisis. An article 
in the OECD Journal on Budgeting found 
that Greece’s “reported budget balance was 
affected by off-budget military spending and 
overestimated surpluses in social security 
funds.” Similarly, Greece’s reported debt and 
deficit levels have been revised almost every 
year since 2000, often by significant amounts, 
and its successive governments have been 
under severe criticism for the inaccuracy 
of their estimates and disclosure (Eurostat, 
2004). Such flaws in its budget reports actu-
ally enabled Greece to join the euro currency 
in 2001 because it misreported its fiscal deficit 
numbers, claiming a budget deficit in 1999 
that was less than three percent (a condition 
required to be met by countries wishing to join 
the common currency) when in fact its budget 
deficit exceeded that target by a substantial 
margin (BBC News, 2004). Studies have also 
indicated that Greece has weak oversight insti-
tutions, including its legislature. Presumably, 
such weaknesses allowed some of the flaws in 
the system to continue. 
Greece was not one of the countries included 
in the Open Budget Survey 2010. Some of the 
problems identified above, such as the weak 
legislative oversight, would likely have been 
illustrated by the Survey. Many of the prob-
lems, however, relate to the inaccuracy of the 
information reported and the ongoing need for 
subsequent revisions, which would not have 
been directly captured by the Survey.
ɆɆThe information presented here was drawn 
from the following sources: BBC News, 
“Greece Admits Fudging Euro Entry,” 
November 2004; Eurostat, “Report by 
Eurostat on the Revision of the Greek 
Government Deficit and Debt Figures,” 
European Union. 2004; Hawkesworth, 
Ian; Daniel Bergvall; Richard Emery; and 
Joachim Wehner, “Budgeting in Greece,” 
OECD Journal on Budgeting, Volume 2008/3; 
and IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, “Greece: 
Report on Observance of Standards and 
Codes – Fiscal Transparency Module,” IMF 
Country Report No. 06/49.”
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any changes in economic assumptions that affect 
approved budget policies.
After the end of the budget year, the executive 
should publish a Year-End Report summarizing 
the financial situation at the end of the fiscal year; 
this report should include an update on progress 
made in achieving the policy goals of the Enacted 
Budget. Good budgeting practices also require that 
a body that is independent from the executive, 
the SAI, issue an annual Audit Report covering all 
activities undertaken by the executive.
Since these budget documents are often highly 
technical, the IBP also recommends that govern-
ments publish simplified versions that are easily 
accessible for a broad audience. These popular ver-
sions of  the budget are called the Citizens Budget.3 
Calculating the OBI Scores and Rankings
Each of the 92 questions used to construct the OBI 
is assigned the same weight when calculating the 
OBI score for a country. The number of questions 
for each of the eight documents assessed, however, 
is different. (If a document is not publicly available, 
then all the questions pertaining to this document 
are automatically assigned a zero score.) As a result 
of this scoring system, some budget documents 
carry a greater weight than others. For example, 
58 of the 92 questions used to construct the OBI 
are related to the Executive’s Budget Proposal, so 
if a country does not publish this document it re-
cieves a zero score on all 58 questions and its OBI 
score is likely to be very low. The emphasis on the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal is due to the fact that 
this is the government’s most important economic 
policy document. For each of the remaining docu-
ments, there are between one and 10 questions.
The OBI assesses budget transparency at the na-
tional or federal level of government. It assesses 
the comprehensiveness of information pertaining 
3 For the purposes of the Open Budget Survey, the IBP assesses 
only the publication of simplified versions of the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal or Enacted Budget as Citizens Budgets.
to government revenues, expenditures, and debt, 
as well as performance-related data on budget 
targets and the actual realization of these targets.
The IBP’s analysis of the Open Budget Index places 
a country into one of five categories based on the 
overall OBI score for the country. Countries receiv-
ing a score between 81 and 100 are categorized as 
providing extensive information on their budgets; 
those scoring between 61 and 80 are categorized as 
providing significant information on their budgets; 
those scoring between 41 and 60, some information 
on their budgets; those scoring between 21 and 40, 
minimal information on their budgets; and those 
scoring between 0 and 20 are categorized as pro-
viding scant or no information on their budgets.
The OBI does not assess subnational budget systems, 
procurement issues, or any information provided 
outside of the eight documents by off-budget in-
stitutions and state-owned enterprises. The OBI 
also does not directly measure the accuracy of in-
formation contained in budget reports — whether 
the information provided is correct — or the degree 
to which government budgets are equitable and 
address the needs of their populace.
Strength of Oversight Institutions
In addition to measuring transparency, the Open 
Budget Survey examines the effectiveness of over-
sight provided by legislatures and SAIs and oppor-
tunities for public engagement in budget decision 
making and monitoring. Twenty-two of the 123 
questions in the Survey assess how the legislature 
and the SAI contribute to budget transparency and 
accountability in a country.4
The average scores received on questions related 
to legislatures and SAIs are used to calculate a 
“strength” score for each institution. These mea-
sures of institutional strength should be used as 
4 Fourteen questions in the Open Budget Survey are used neither to 
construct the OBI nor calculate “strength” of legislatures and SAIs. 
These questions are on miscellaneous budget issues that the IBP 
decided not to analyze for this report. 
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indicative data only, as the data on questions on the 
legislature and the SAI are not as comprehensive 
as is that on issues of public access to information.
More details on the methodology used by the IBP 
to complete the Open Budget Survey and compile 
the OBI are available on the IBP website.
Determining Public Availability
“The budget should not have any loopholes 
because every piece of money matters. There 
should be a transparent implementation of 
the budget so that even the people living in 
the remotest part of the country will be aware 
of how his/her life is affected by the daily ad-
ministrative activities of the government. But 
above all, the budget should aim at uplifting 
the life status of all the citizens.” 
	—	Bidushi	Pokhrel	-	high	school	student	and	Winner	of	the	2010	
south	asia	open	Budgets	essay	Competition	for	nepal
To be considered publicly available in the Open 
Budget Survey, a document has to meet two basic 
criteria:
ɆɆ it must be published within a reasonable time-
frame by the institution or agency responsible 
for producing the document; and
ɆɆit must be available at minimal cost to any per-
son who wishes to access the document (i.e., the 
government must not make documents avail-
able selectively, or only to certain individuals 
or groups).
The Open Budget Survey specifies the timeframe 
within which each of the eight budget documents 
it assesses should be released. Guidelines issued by 
the IMF and the OECD recommend good or best 
practices for when different budget documents 
should be published by governments. The Open 
Budget Survey draws on these guidelines but it also 
recognizes that not all countries are currently in a 
position to meet them. Therefore, the Open Budget 
Survey distinguishes between those governments 
that are publishing documents within a reasonable 
timeframe and those that are publishing documents 
so late after the recommended release period as 
to make public access to these documents almost 
meaningless. So, for example, even though best 
practice guidelines recommend that the Year-End 
Report and the Audit Report should be published 
within six months of the end of the budget year, 
the Open Budget Survey allows for a maximum of 
two years within which these documents must be 
published to be considered as publicly available. A 
complete list of the Survey’s timeframes for each 
of the eight key budget reports is available in the 
Guide to the Open Budget Questionnaire 2010 on 
the IBP’s website (see Box 4).
Assessing whether a document is freely available to 
anyone who wishes to access it can be a complicated 
task for some of the researchers and peer reviewers 
working on the Open Budget Survey. When a gov-
ernment makes its budget reports available on the 
website(s) of the relevant agency(ies) responsible 
for producing these reports (typically the Ministry 
of Finance or Treasury) and the reports’ release 
dates are clearly identified (and fall within the 
specified timeframe), there is no ambiguity about 
the public availability of the document.
Many cases are not that straightforward. For ex-
ample, while a majority of governments assessed 
in the Open Budget Survey 2010 make most of 
their published budget reports available on the 
Internet, in some cases, governments only make 
hard copies of these documents available. In other 
cases, it is unclear when a budget document was 
uploaded on the government’s website, so it is dif-
ficult to assess whether the document was publicly 
released within the timeframe used by the Open 
Budget Survey.
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The Open Budget Survey 2010 is published 
on IBP’s website at www.openbudgetindex.
org. In addition to the 2010 Survey report, the 
website contains numerous other resources. 
These include:
ɆɆcompleted questionnaires and country sum-
mary reports for all 94 countries;
ɆɆdata tables with analysis of the Survey 
results;
ɆɆa guide to the questionnaire;
ɆɆan Excel database of answers to the Survey;
ɆɆOBI rankings for all 94 countries;
ɆɆa press release on the Survey results;
ɆɆa report on the methodology used to com-
plete the Survey; and
ɆɆa list of the researchers for each of the 94 
countries.
The website contains similar information 
for the 2006 and 2008 surveys. Further, the 
website contains other information on budget 
transparency, including: 
ɆɆa guide to budget transparency describing 
the information that should be contained 
in the eight key budget documents;
ɆɆcase studies on how civil society groups 
have successfully used budget reports to 
monitor government budgets;
ɆɆmultimedia products, including videos, 
podcasts, and other audio products (includ-
ing the popular OBI song); 
ɆɆa description of the Open Budget Initiative, 
including other projects supported by the 
Initiative; and
ɆɆ information on an IBP program that is 
providing free technical assistance to na-
tional governments on open budget issues 
(www.internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/
mentoring-gov-program/).
Numerous other resources on civil society 
budget work and information on the IBP’s 
yearly reports and funding can be accessed at 
www.internationalbudget.org. You can sign 
up to receive our bimonthly e-newsletter on 
the website, as well.
Box 4. 
online open budget Survey resources
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A few examples of barriers to access to budget 
documents in countries included in the Open 
Budget Survey 2010 are described below. Despite 
these barriers, all the referenced documents were 
treated as publicly available by the Survey.
ɆɆIn Kenya a copy of the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal is available on payment of approxi-
mately US$125. This document is not published 
on any government website; however, copies 
of the document are available for free in pub-
lic libraries and at public information desks 
throughout the country.
ɆɆIn Zambia a copy of the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal is available on payment of approxi-
mately US$50. But copies of this proposal are 
in short supply and sometimes not available 
even for purchase by those who can afford to 
pay this fee. The Executive’s Budget Proposal 
is not published on any government website.
ɆɆIn Mali hard copies of the budget documents 
can be examined at no cost at a national public 
library, but anyone wishing to have a personal 
copy must pay the cost of photocopying them. 
Since the Executive’s Budget Proposal and sup-
porting budget documents in Mali comprise 
more than 1,000 pages, photocopying these 
documents in their entirety can cost more than 
US$100 — in a country with a per capita income 
of approximately US$1,200. These documents 
are not published on any government website.
ɆɆIn Malawi the Executive’s Budget Proposal is 
available for free from the Ministry of Finance 
office on the day the budget is presented to the 
legislature. Typically, however, there are not 
sufficient copies of the document to meet de-
mand. The Executive’s Budget Proposal is not 
published on any government website.
ɆɆIn Albania the Executive’s Budget Proposal is 
published on the Ministry of Finance website 
when the document is presented to the leg-
islature. However, the ministry removes the 
document from its website when the budget 
is enacted into law and does not archive prior 
years’ proposals.
ɆɆIn Mongolia the SAI publishes Audit Reports 
on its website; however, the website was not 
working for almost a year during the Survey 
research period.
The IBP believes that many of these problems 
would not exist if governments simply published 
budget documents on their websites (and ensured 
that these websites function properly).
Even though the Open Budget Survey 2010 re-
cords all of the documents from the examples 
presented above as “available,” some are clearly 
more “available” than others. In future rounds of 
the Survey, the IBP intends to establish and apply 
more refined criteria regarding what constitutes 
“public availability” to ensure that all nuances sur-
rounding availability are captured and to ensure 
true comparability across countries on this issue. It 
is possible that once these criteria are established, 
countries that continue to follow practices such 
as those cited above may not be scored as making 
certain documents “publicly available.”
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Structure of this Report
The remainder of this report is divided into the 
following chapters. Chapter two presents the 
overall results for the most recent year examined. 
Chapter three discusses the changes in the OBI 
scores between the three applications of the Open 
Budget Survey. Chapter four assesses the relative 
strength of legislatures and SAIs and the oppor-
tunities available to the public to participate in 
budget decision making. Chapter five presents 
recommendations for measures that can lead to 
immediate improvements in budget transpar-
ency as well as those that can be implemented 
immediately but that may only yield results in the 
longer term. Appendix A provides brief profiles 
of the changes that occurred in several countries 
in which transparency significantly improved, or 
deteriorated, over the past few years. •
“We know that the government is of the people, 
by the people, and for the people. But govern-
ment funds are of the people, by the people, 
but not for the people.”
—Bhavya	Joshi,	high	school	student	and	Participant	in	the	2010	south	
asia	open	Budgets	essay	Competition	for	India
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chaptEr twO: 
Results for the 
Open Budget 
Index 2010
Overall Scores Reveal Lack of Budget 
Transparency
The Open Budget Survey 2010 reveals that the 
public in most of the 94 countries assessed has 
limited access to even basic information about 
their governments’ revenue and expenditures 
and, therefore, limited ability to understand or 
influence their government’s budget priorities.
The average OBI 2010 score of the countries sur-
veyed was 42. In other words, on average, most 
countries provided less than half of the budget 
information required to be transparent.
Table 1 divides countries into the five OBI 
categories and shows:
ɆɆOnly 20 of the 94 countries (21 percent) included 
in the Open Budget Survey 2010 provide their 
citizens with enough budget data to enable 
them to develop a comprehensive analysis and 
understanding of their national budgets. These 
this chapter reports the obi results for 2010 and consists of four parts. 
I. The overall OBI 2010 scores that countries received
II. Illustrative examples of the types of budget information governments fail to 
make available
III. A deeper look at the Survey’s assessment of  the eight key budget docu-
ments in the countries studied, focusing on whether the documents were 
published
IV. An analysis of how various characteristics of countries, such as their levels of 
aid or their dependence on hydrocarbons for revenues, correspond to their 
OBI 2010 scores
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are the countries providing significant or ex-
tensive amounts of information.
ɆɆMany of the countries providing the most budget 
information are western developed countries, but 
they also include South Africa, which received 
the highest OBI 2010 score. Also of note, several 
relatively low-income countries — such as India, 
Sri Lanka, and Ukraine — provided significant 
information.
ɆɆAbout one-third of the countries (33 of the 94) 
studied provide some information, scoring be-
tween 41 and 60 on the OBI. The budget systems 
in these countries should not be considered 
closed but they do need to improve considerably 
before true public discussion and understand-
ing of budget policies and priorities can occur.
ɆɆSome developed countries in this category — 
such as Italy and Portugal — might have been 
expected to have more open budget systems. 
There are also some positive surprises in this 
category, including Mongolia, which in a short 
period of time has gone from being a country that 
provided scant budget information to one that 
provides much more comprehensive informa-
tion (its score fell just short of placing it in the 
“significant information” category).
ɆɆIn a plurality of countries (41 of 94), the amount 
of information provided is sorely inadequate. 
This includes 19 countries in which only minimal 
information is provided, as well as 22 countries 
in which scant — little to no — budget informa-
tion is provided. In 21 of these 22 countries 
the Executive’s Budget Proposal is not even 
released. These 22 countries are Algeria, Bolivia, 
Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican 
Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Honduras, 
Iraq, Kyrgyz Republic, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
São Tomé e Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Sudan, and Vietnam. Three of these countries 
(Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, and São Tomé e Príncipe) 
do not publish any budget-related information 
assessed by the OBI.
Many of the countries in these categories may not be 
surprising as they are countries where governance is-
sues have often been flagged. Yet some, such as China, 
the world’s most populated country, or Saudi Arabia, 
a relatively high-income country, clearly have the 
institutional capacity or resources to provide more 
budget information if they choose to do so. Further, 
countries like Rwanda (which many experts cite as 
a model for development) and oil-rich Nigeria could 
be expected to do better on budget transparency, 
and newly democratic Iraq could be expected to do 
at least as well as newly democratic Afghanistan.
Key Categories of  
information Missing
The nature of the information that govern-
ment budget documents fail to provide is often 
significant. For example, almost half of the 
world’s population — more than three billion 
people — live on less than US$2.50 per day. For 
these people, their country’s budget has a re-
distributive function to tackle poverty. Yet only 
17 of the 94 countries assessed in the OBI 2010 
provide comprehensive information on policies 
intended to alleviate poverty, and many of these 
are countries in which only a small section of the 
population suffers from acute poverty.
Government budgets often lack not only data 
on poverty programs but also other information 
that can help explain the relationship between 
the government’s budget and its policy and mac-
roeconomic goals. Further, data on outputs and 
outcomes expected and achieved are typically 
missing in budget reports; this information is im-
portant for those who are interested in monitoring 
the budget’s impact.
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In addition, there is very little transparency about 
activities that occur “off budget.” Extra-budgetary 
funds are government transactions that are not 
typically managed through the annual budget 
process and, therefore, are not subject to the same 
level of reporting, regulation, or audit as other 
public transactions. However, best practice guide-
lines recommend that information on these funds 
should be provided in the budget. Extra-budgetary 
funds traditionally have included pensions or 
social security funds, state-owned enterprises, 
and discretionary or secret funds. More recently 
they have also typically included donor aid, the 
proceeds of privatization, and arrangements for 
TaBle 1. 
DiStriButiOn Of cOuntrieS BaSeD On OBi 2010 ScOreS
OBI SuBScOreS 
NumBer Of 
cOuNtrIeS cOuNtrIeS
extensiVe 
inforMAtion
(OBI suB–scOres 81-100)
7
France, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States
signifiCAnt
(OBI suBscOres 61-80) 13
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, 
India, Peru, Poland, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Ukraine 
soMe 
(OBI suBscOres 41-60) 33
Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia, 
Botswana, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, 
Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Italy, 
Jordan, Kenya, Macedonia, Malawi, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda
MiniMAl 
(OBI suBscOres 21-40) 19
Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Timór-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, 
Yemen, Zambia
sCAnt
(OBI suBscOres 0-20) 22
Algeria, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Chad, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, 
Honduras, Iraq, Kyrgyz Republic, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, São Tomé e Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Sudan, Vietnam
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public-private partnerships. On average, extra-
budgetary funds account for nearly 40 percent of 
central government expenditures in transitional 
and developing countries. However, the OBI 2010 
reports that 41 of the 94 countries surveyed provide 
no information on extra-budgetary funds in their 
Executive’s Budget Proposals.
Quasi-fiscal activities are any activities under-
taken by state-owned enterprises, and sometimes 
by private sector companies at the direction of 
the government, in which the prices charged are 
less than usual or the “market rate.” Examples 
include subsidized bank loans provided by the 
central bank or other government-owned banks 
and noncommercial public services provided by 
state-owned enterprises. In recent years there 
has been an increased emphasis on governments 
having a balanced budget and low levels of debt. 
Such prescriptions may increase incentives for 
governments to use quasi-fiscal activities that 
mask the true cost of their policies, and thus make 
their fiscal position look better than it really is. 
The OBI 2010 reports that 69 countries provide 
no information on quasi-fiscal activities in their 
budget proposals.
Contingent liabilities are debts that the government 
may owe, but whose existence and total cost depend 
on future events. For example, a government may 
guarantee a loan, but it will only be liable to make 
the payment if the recipient of the loan does not 
repay the loan. Pensions and government guarantees 
are common forms of contingent liabilities. The 
recent global economic crisis has put a spotlight 
on the funding that governments have provided to 
private banks and other corporations affected by 
the crisis. While governments’ decisions to offer 
aid to private corporations were generally made 
in the absence of a legal obligation on the part of 
government toward the corporations receiving the 
aid, governments are legally bound to make good 
any loans taken by private and public corporations 
that the governments have guaranteed. The OBI 
2010 reports that only 11 governments provide 
extensive information in their budget proposals on 
their contingent liabilities, while 55 governments 
provide no such information.
The paucity of information on extra-budgetary 
funds, quasi-fiscal activities, and contingent li-
abilities means that a large portion of government 
activities are carried out without scrutiny. Thus 
the public is unable to discern the government’s 
true fiscal picture.
document results
The OBI 2010 scores reflect whether countries 
publish eight key budget documents and the na-
ture of the information contained within them. 
This section examines the publication of these 
documents and their comprehensiveness.
“In Indonesia, there is no In-Year Report made 
available to the public, and there is no Year-end 
Report and Citizens Budget. We believe that 
these three documents are really important to 
conducting public debates on the budget. and 
why is public debate important? It’s important 
because the budget is not the government’s; it has 
to spend the public’s money on the public’s needs.”
—		siti	Fatimah	-	open	Budget	survey	2010	researcher	from	the	
Bangdung	Institute	of	governance	studies,	Indonesia
Many documents are not publicly available
The Open Budget Survey 2010 found that when all 
the documents for all the 94 countries assessed are 
considered, some 42 percent — or nearly half — of 
the key budget reports considered were not even 
available to the public.
Table 2 shows that not one of the eight budget 
documents is published everywhere, and several 
documents are published in just a minority of 
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countries. The Enacted Budget is the most com-
monly published document: only 13 percent of the 
countries surveyed failed to issue this document. 
About one in every four countries fails to make 
public the Executive’s Budget Proposal, In-Year 
Reports, or Year-End Report. In these countries, 
the public has at best scant information on what 
budget policies the executive branch proposed, 
how the budget is being implemented during the 
year, or how, in the final analysis, public funds were 
spent or revenues collected.
Two of every three countries do not issue a Pre-Budget 
Statement or release a Mid-Year Review. Five in six 
countries do not publish a Citizens Budget.
Many of the unpublished documents actually 
are produced for internal purposes
Most of the budget documents that are not pub-
lished by governments are not produced at all. In 
such instances, not only the public but also the 
government itself may not understand key aspects 
of the budget picture. For instance, in 11 countries 
no In-Year Reports are produced, and in 40 coun-
tries no Mid-Year Reviews are produced. In such 
countries, the government’s own understanding of 
how the budget is being implemented is significantly 
constrained. As a result, its ability, for instance, to 
make necessary corrections is quite limited.
Further, when a document is not produced, the 
barriers to improving budget transparency are 
high. Countries likely need to be convinced that it 
is worth the effort to produce the documents, and 
the institutional infrastructure needed to produce 
them might need to be created.
However, a surprisingly large share of documents 
are produced by governments but are used only for 
internal purposes. Of the budget documents that 
surveyed governments fail to publish, 42 percent are 
in fact produced.5 In these instances, the barriers 
5 The 94 governments covered cumulatively publish 436 of the 752 
budget documents (or approximately 58 percent) whose availability 
is assessed by the Survey. Of the 316 documents that are not pub-
to improving budget transparency are lower. The 
issue becomes convincing countries that these 
internal documents should be made public.
The data presented in Chart 1 indicate that, with 
the exception of the Citizens Budget, each of the 
individual budget documents is often produced 
but not made publicly available. Of special note, 
all 22 countries that fail to release the Executive’s 
Budget Proposal to the public do produce this 
document for internal purposes. Similarly, in the 
majority of instances where countries do not make 
their Enacted Budget, Audit Report, or Year-End 
lished, 134 — or 42 percent — are produced but are used for internal 
purposes only.
TaBle 2. 
many BuDget DOcumentS 
are nOt availaBle
documenT
percenTage of counTries 
ThaT fail To publish
pre-budget 
stAteMent 65%
exeCutiVe’s 
budget proposAl 23%
Citizens budget 83%
enACted budget 13%
in-yeAr reports 25%
Mid-yeAr reView 70%
yeAr-end report 22%
Audit report 35%
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Looking at the different budget documents that 
are actually made public, the average amount of 
information provided varies substantially. When 
the Pre-Budget Statement, Enacted Budget, Citizens 
Budget, and In-Year Reports are published, they 
also typically provide extensive information (see 
Table 3).
TaBle 3. 
puBliSheD BuDget 
DOcumentS vary in the 
amOunt Of infOrmatiOn 
they prOviDe
documenT
average obi 2010  
subscores for 
counTries ThaT 
publish
pre-budget stAteMent 81
exeCutiVe’s budget 
proposAl
58
Citizens budget 86
enACted budget 80
in-yeAr reports 76
Mid-yeAr reView 63
yeAr-end report 42
Audit report 52
Governments that publish an Executive’s Budget 
Proposal and Mid-Year Review, by contrast, provide 
an average of just three-fifths of the information re-
quired by the OBI. The published Year-End Reports 
and Audit Reports are the least comprehensive of all, 
providing half or less of the information required.
Report available to the public, these documents 
are prepared for internal purposes.
Of particular interest is that the differences between 
countries falling in different OBI categories when 
it comes to producing documents are fairly modest. 
For example, the best scoring countries produce 93 
percent of the eight key budget documents while 
the worst scoring countries produce 73 percent. 
The big differences between countries falling in 
different OBI categories are in making those docu-
ments available to the public. Most dramatically, 
not a single document produced by the high scoring 
countries (those with OBI 2010 scores between 81 
and 100) is used for internal purposes only, while 
the majority of budget documents produced by 
the worst scoring countries are not released to 
the public.6 In other words, low-scoring countries 
(those with OBI 2010 scores between 0 and 20) 
could substantially improve their levels of budget 
transparency if they simply began to publish docu-
ments they already produce.
How Comprehensive Are the Reports that 
Are Published?
“Since a country’s citizens fund the govern-
ment, they should have a right to know how 
the government is spending their money. This 
is essential as an incentive for the government 
to effectively use public funds for the benefit 
of its people. The budget provides important 
information on the government’s activities in 
the year ahead, but often this information is too 
perfunctory to be of adequate use; governments 
need to make more detailed information easily 
accessible for public scrutiny.”
—	Faraz	W.	rahman	–	high	school	student	and	Winner	of	the	2010	
south	asia	open	Budgets	Competition	for	Bangladesh
6 Among countries with OBI scores falling between 0 and 20, some 60 
percent of the documents produced were not actually made public.
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Country Characteristics 
and budget openness
What is it about countries that lead them to 
score high or low on the OBI? We do not attempt 
to answer this question fully, but we do test a 
number of key characteristics of countries to see 
how they correlate with budget transparency.7
As expected, and as also found by the 2008 Survey, 
countries performing poorly on the OBI 2010 tend 
to have low income levels, be located in Africa and 
the Middle East, be dependent on foreign aid, rely 
on revenues from the sale of hydrocarbons, and 
are quite likely to have authoritarian or hybrid 
systems of government. Many of these relation-
ships overlap because, for example, sub-Saharan 
African countries tend to be poor and also tend to 
be more reliant on aid.
There are, however, important exceptions to these 
general correlations or relationships. As discussed 
below, budget transparency has been achieved in 
a wide variety of country contexts.
Relationship Between Transparency and 
Income
The Open Budget Survey 2010 finds that countries 
that are very transparent on their budgets are 
generally high-income countries, while countries 
that lack transparency generally have low income 
levels (see Table 4). This is not an unexpected 
finding since high-income countries are typically 
countries with well-established public finance 
management systems, while countries that are very 
poor typically do not have mature public finance 
management systems.
There is, however, no inevitable link between low 
incomes and poor transparency practices; countries 
with low incomes can achieve relatively high levels 
7 The IBP has commissioned studies to assess these correlations more 
rigorously and the results from these studies will be published shortly.
of budget transparency. As Table 4 also shows, 
countries providing “some” information on their 
budgets are not on average all that much richer than 
countries providing “minimal” or “scant” informa-
tion. Further, well-off countries like Equatorial 
Guinea (per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing 
power parity of US$18,600 in 2009), Saudi Arabia 
($23,221), Trinidad and Tobago ($19,818), and 
Malaysia ($13,770) perform very poorly on the OBI 
2010. In contrast, low-income countries like India 
(GDP per capita of $2,941), Sri Lanka ($4,769), and 
Ukraine ($6,340) perform relatively well.
TaBle 4. 
incOme levelS anD 
tranSparency
obi 2010 scores
average gdp per 
capiTa 2009 ppp 
income in us$
extensiVe inforMAtion
(OBI scOres 81-100) 34,308
signifiCAnt
(OBI scOres 61-80) 16,783
soMe
(OBI scOres 41-60) 8,770
MiniMAl
(OBI scOres 21-40) 6,322
sCAnt or no 
inforMAtion
(OBI scOres 0-20)
4,698
Source for Income Levels: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010
Relationship Between Transparency and 
Geographical Region
The United States and countries located in Western 
Europe receive the highest average scores in the 
OBI 2010 (see Table 5). The regions of the world 
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with very low levels of budget transparency are 
the Middle East & North Africa and sub-Saharan 
Africa. The other four regions of the world — East 
Asia & Pacific, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, 
Latin America & Caribbean, and South Asia — fall 
in the middle.
These average tendencies again obscure interest-
ing exceptions. Some countries in these regions 
receive much higher scores in the OBI 2010 than 
the average scores for their regions. For example, 
two countries in the Middle East & North Africa 
— Jordan (OBI score of 50) and Egypt (OBI score 
of 49) — receive scores that are more than triple 
the average scores for the other countries in this 
region in the OBI 2010. Similarly, a few countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa — such as South Africa 
(OBI score of 92), Uganda (55), Namibia (53), and 
Botswana (51) — received scores that are signifi-
cantly more than double the average scores for the 
other countries in this region. Further, countries 
like Chile (OBI score of 72), South Korea (71), and 
Slovenia (70) received scores that are comparable 
to the average scores for the U.S. and countries in 
Western Europe.
Relationship Between Transparency and 
Dependency on Revenues from Natural 
Resource Extraction
Of the 94 countries included in the Open Budget 
Survey 2010, 14 countries are heavily dependent 
on revenues from the sale of minerals and 24 
countries are heavily dependent on revenues 
from the sale of hydrocarbons. The 2010 Survey 
finds that the average OBI score of the countries 
that are heavily dependent on revenues from the 
sales of hydrocarbons ( just 26 out of 100) is much 
lower than the average OBI scores of the countries 
that are dependent on revenues from the sale of 
minerals or that are not dependent on revenues 
from the sale of natural resources.
Studies discussing the “oil curse” have shown 
that hydrocarbon regimes, especially those that 
are autocracies, are particularly susceptible to 
corruption because of the nature and size of the 
revenue streams.8 In these countries, there is an 
even greater need for budgets to be transparent 
and the Open Budget Survey 2010 findings on 
the dismal state of budget transparency in these 
countries are of great concern.
TaBle 5. 
OBi 2010 ScOreS 
vary By regiOn
region
number of 
counTries 
included 
in obi 2010
average obi 
2010 scores
eAst AsiA & 
pACifiC 13 42
eAstern europe 
& CentrAl AsiA 18 52
lAtin AMeriCA 
& CAribbeAn 16 43
Middle eAst & 
north AfriCA 8 23
south AsiA 6 48
sub-sAhArAn 
AfriCA 24 28
western europe 
& the u.s. 9 74
overAll 
performAnCe 94 42
Once again, however, there are exceptions to the 
general correlation between transparency and the 
8 See, for example, Ross, Michael, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?,” 
World Politics, Volume 53, Number 3, April 2001, pp. 325-361; and 
Kolstad, Ivar and Arne Wiig, “Transparency in Oil Rich Economies” 
U4 ISSUE 2:2007.
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country characteristic examined. Certain countries 
that are heavily dependent on revenues from the 
sale of hydrocarbons — such as Colombia (OBI score 
of 61), Mexico (52), and Indonesia (51) — receive 
OBI 2010 scores that are significantly more than 
double the average scores receive by all the other 
countries that are dependent on revenues from 
the sale of hydrocarbons. 
Relationship Between Transparency and Aid
Countries that receive a significant amount of 
donor aid tend to perform poorly on the OBI 2010. 
Eighteen of the 94 countries included in the 2010 
Survey receive donor aid that constitutes more 
than 10 percent of their gross national income; 
these countries receive an average OBI 2010 score 
of 30. Fourteen countries receive donor aid that 
constitutes between 5 and 10 percent of their gross 
national income; these countries receive an aver-
age OBI score of 31.
Both categories of aid-dependent countries fared 
significantly worse than countries that are not aid 
dependent. Fifty-one countries included in the 
2010 Survey receive aid constituting less than 
five percent of their gross national income; these 
countries received an average OBI 2010 score of 44.
This is one area where the results differ modestly 
TaBle 6. 
cOuntrieS DepenDent On hyDrOcarBOn 
extractiOn tenD tO Be leSS tranSparent
naTural resource 
dependency
number of 
counTries
average 
obi scores counTries
MinerAl 
(cOal, cOpper, dIamOnds, 
gOld, platInum, 
sIlver Or tIn)
13 49
Botswana, Chile, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ghana, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Liberia, Mongolia, Namibia, Papua New 
Guinea, Peru, South Africa, Zambia
hydroCArbon 24 26
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, 
Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia*, Iraq, 
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, 
Russia, São Tomé e Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Timór-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen
not resourCe 
dependent 57 48 Others
Source: Countries are categorized based on the IMF Guide for 
Revenue Transparency 2007.
Countries are considered rich in hydrocarbons or mineral resources 
on the basis of the following criteria:
(i) An average share of hydrocarbon or mineral fiscal revenues of 
at least 25 percent of total fiscal revenues during the period 
2000-2005 or
(ii) An average share of hydrocarbon or mineral export proceeds of 
at least 25 percent of total exports proceeds during the period 
2000-2005.
Indonesia is also a mineral producer but their dependency on oil 
production is more significant
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from the results of the Open Budget Survey 2008. 
In the earlier survey, the most aid-dependent coun-
tries did receive lower scores than the moderately 
aid-dependent countries, and the gap in the scores 
of aid dependent countries and those countries not 
dependent on aid was even larger. 9
Relationship Between Transparency and 
Democracy
The Open Budget Survey 2010 finds that coun-
tries that have democratic governments receive 
on average much higher OBI scores than those 
of countries that do not have democratic gov-
ernments. For purposes of this assessment, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 
2008 is utilized; this Index classifies countries into 
four categories based on their levels of democracy. 
According to the Democracy Index, full democra-
cies have free and fair elections, well-functioning 
government institutions, and their citizens are able 
to participate freely in the political sphere. Flawed 
democracies are characterized as having lower levels 
of political participation than in full democracies 
and their democratic cultures are typically weak. 
Hybrid regimes lack the necessary political partici-
pation and functioning government institutions to 
be classified as democracies. Finally, authoritarian 
regimes do not conduct credible elections; they 
also have low levels of political participation and 
inefficient government institutions.
Even though it may appear that democracy and 
transparency are to some degree tautological, 
the specific indicators assessed by the Democracy 
Index and the Open Budget Index are different. 
Therefore, an assessment of the correlation between 
whether a country is classified as a “democracy” 
based on its score on the Democracy Index and its 
9  The 2008 Survey found that countries in which donor aid consti-
tuted more than 10 percent of their gross national income received 
the lowest overall average scores on the OBI (16 countries in this 
category of aid dependency received an average OBI 2008 score of 
21). The 2008 Survey also reported that the 13 countries in which 
donor aid constituted between 5 and 10 percent of their gross national 
income received an average OBI 2008 score of 33, or modestly better. 
Forty-nine countries included in the 2008 Survey received aid that 
constituted less than five percent of their gross national income; 
these countries received an average OBI 2008 score of 42.
transparency level based on the OBI 2010 is not 
an assessment of identical criteria.
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The Open Budget Survey 2010 includes 14 coun-
tries that are classified as “full” democracies by 
the Democracy Index; these countries received 
an average OBI score of 72 out of 100. The Survey 
also includes 33 countries that are classified as 
“flawed” democracies; these countries received an 
average score of 51 on the OBI 2010. Twenty-five 
countries in the Survey are classified as “hybrid” 
regimes, and they received an average score of 
36, which is more than double the average score 
received by the 21 countries that are classified as 
“authoritarian” regimes, which received an average 
OBI 2010 score of 17 out of 100.10 •
10 The 2008 Democracy Index does not cover one country, São 
Tomé e Príncipe, that is part of the 2010 OBI.
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SCANT OR NO INFORMATION
(OBI SCORES 0-20)
MINIMAL
(OBI SCORES 21-40)
SOME
(OBI SCORES 41-60)
SIGNIFICANT
(OBI SCORES 61-80)
EXTENSIVE INFORMATION
(OBI SCORES 81-100)
NOT SURVEYED
SOUTH AFRICA  92
NEW ZEALAND  90
UNITED KINGDOM  87
FRANCE  87
NORWAY  83
SWEDEN  83
UNITED STATES  82
CHILE  72 BRAZIL  71
SOUTH KOREA  71
SLOVENIA  70
GERMANY  68
SRI LANKA  67
INDIA  67
PERU  65
POLAND  64
SPAIN  63
CZECH REPUBLIC  62 UKRAINE  62
COLOMBIA  61
RUSSIA  60
MONGOLIA  60
ROMANIA  59
ITALY  58
PORTUGAL  58
PAPUA NEW GUINEA  57
CROATIA  57
SLOVAKIA  57
TURKEY  57
ARGENTINA  56
BULGARIA  56
UGANDA  55
PHILIPPINES  55
GEORGIA  55
GHANA  54
SERBIA  54
NAMIBIA  53
MEXICO  52
BOTSWANA  51
INDONESIA  51
JORDAN  50
GUATEMALA  50
KENYA  49
EGYPT  49
MACEDONIA  49
BANGLADESH  48MALAWI  47
COSTA RICA  47
NEPAL  45
TANZANIA  45
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA  44
AZERBAIJAN  43
THAILAND  42
LIBERIA  40
MALAYSIA  39
PAKISTAN  38
KAZAKHSTAN  38
EL SALVADOR  37
NICARAGUA  37
ZAMBIA  36
MALI  35
TIMÓR-LESTE  34
VENEZUELA  34
ALBANIA  33
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO  33
LEBANON  32
ECUADOR  31
MOZAMBIQUE  28
MOROCCO  28
ANGOLA  26
YEMEN  25
AFGHANISTAN  21
NIGERIA  18
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC  15
CAMBODIA  15
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  14
VIETNAM  14
BOLIVIA  13
CHINA  13
HONDURAS  11
RWANDA  11
SUDAN  8
DEM. REP. OF CONGO  6
BURKINA FASO  5
NIGER  3
SENEGAL  3
CAMEROON  2
SAUDI ARABIA  1
ALGERIA  1
CHAD  0
IRAQ  0
EQUATORIAL GUINEA  0
FIJI  0
SÃO TOMÉ E PRÍNCIPE  0
OBi 2010 ScOreS 
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MALAYSIA  39
PAKISTAN  38
KAZAKHSTAN  38
EL SALVADOR  37
NICARAGUA  37
ZAMBIA  36
MALI  35
TIMÓR-LESTE  34
VENEZUELA  34
ALBANIA  33
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO  33
LEBANON  32
ECUADOR  31
MOZAMBIQUE  28
MOROCCO  28
ANGOLA  26
YEMEN  25
AFGHANISTAN  21
NIGERIA  18
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC  15
CAMBODIA  15
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  14
VIETNAM  14
BOLIVIA  13
CHINA  13
HONDURAS  11
RWANDA  11
SUDAN  8
DEM. REP. OF CONGO  6
BURKINA FASO  5
NIGER  3
SENEGAL  3
CAMEROON  2
SAUDI ARABIA  1
ALGERIA  1
CHAD  0
IRAQ  0
EQUATORIAL GUINEA  0
FIJI  0
SÃO TOMÉ E PRÍNCIPE  0
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chaptEr thrEE: 
Changes 
over Time
The 2010 Survey marks the third time the IBP and its partners have implemented this 
research instrument. While the time span covered is somewhat limited — the other 
surveys were conducted in 2006 and 2008 — interesting patterns have begun to 
emerge. These patterns are the subject of this chapter.
OBI Scores Have Risen Generally and Have 
Risen Sharply Among Low-Scoring Countries
Even though the 2010 Survey reports major con-
straints in public access to basic budget data (a 
finding that is consistent with the findings of the 
previous surveys) the survey series records im-
provement in budget transparency practices over 
the past four years. The average score received by 
40 countries for which comparable data is avail-
able across the three surveys was 47 out of 100 in 
2006. The average scores received by these same 
40 countries went up to 54 in the 2008 Survey and 
to 56 in the 2010 Survey.Ma
rie
lle
 va
n 
Ui
te
rt/
UN
D
P
	 InternatIonal	Budget	PartnershIP38
TaBle 7. 
changeS in OBi ScOreS Between 2006 anD 2010 ShOw that 
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Similarly, the average scores for 78 countries 
that were included in the 2008 Survey for which 
comparable data is available has gone up from 40 
to 43 in the 2010 Survey.
The changes in OBI scores were found in countries 
that had been in different OBI categories in pre-
ceding surveys (see Table 7). For example, some 
countries like Afghanistan and Yemen were clas-
sified as providing scant information (OBI scores 
between 0 and 20) on their budgets in the OBI 2008 
but moved up to the next higher level of providing 
minimal information (OBI scores between 21 and 
40) in 2010. Azerbaijan and Egypt went from the 
scant information category in the OBI 2006 to the 
some information category (OBI scores between 
41 and 60) in 2008. India and Sri Lanka went from 
providing some information in 2006 to providing 
significant information (OBI scores between 61 and 
80) in the OBI 2010. There were improvements in 
the top categories, as well, with Norway moving 
from the significant information category in the 
OBI 2006 to the extensive category (OBI scores 
between 81 and 100) in 2010.
Some governments — especially those that scored 
very low in earlier rounds of the OBI —largely 
achieved these improvements by taking one basic 
and inexpensive step: they began to make available 
on their websites the budget documents that they 
had been producing but making available only to 
internal government audiences or donors. In many 
cases, these governments began to publish their 
Executive’s Budget Proposal, arguably the most 
important domestic policy document produced 
by any government. For example, the Liberian 
and Yemeni governments published their budget 
proposals for the first time in 2009. These examples 
provide hope that the 22 governments included in 
the 2010 Survey that are not currently publish-
ing their Executive’s Budget Proposals can easily 
and quickly improve their own level of budget 
transparency.
Other governments that did not score very low in 
earlier rounds of the OBI improved by increasing 
the comprehensiveness of their published budget 
documents, especially the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal and Audit Reports. For example, India, 
Colombia, and Sri Lanka increased their OBI 
scores and moved up from the some information 
category to significant mainly by publishing more 
comprehensive budget proposals.
Progress among countries that previously per-
formed very poorly on the OBI and are generally 
regarded as challenged by poverty or instability 
has been especially noteworthy. The average OBI 
score for the 14 countries that were the bottom 
two categories of the OBI 2006 (and for which 
comparable data is available) has gone up from 25 
to 40 on the OBI 2010. Notable improvers in the 
OBI series include Egypt, Mongolia, and Uganda. 
Similar improvements were also found in the 
OBI 2010 for some countries assessed for the first 
time in the OBI 2008.11 These countries, including 
Afghanistan, Liberia, and Yemen, increased their 
scores substantially.
While none of the countries scoring poorly in 
previous surveys have yet to meet best practices 
for budget transparency, they have been able to 
expand transparency by implementing simple, low-
cost measures — demonstrating that the achieve-
ment of budget transparency depends primarily 
on a government’s will rather than its resources. 
Perhaps nothing illustrates this central point more 
than the fact that Mongolia modestly outperforms 
high-income countries like Italy and Portugal.
Understanding a government’s behavior and its 
motives for changing practices requires an in-depth 
study of the political economy (and other factors) 
in the country. The IBP is supporting the develop-
ment of a set of comprehensive case studies in 8-10 
countries that will attempt to place changes in 
levels of budget transparency into each country’s 
11 The average score for the 21 countries that were assessed for the 
first time in 2008 and that received OBI 2008 scores below 40 went 
up from 14 to 17 in the 2010 Survey. 
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broader political and economic contexts; these 
case studies are to be completed by 2011.
However, based on the changes observed over the 
survey series, the IBP has had some preliminary 
conversations with researchers and international 
budget experts to develop some initial hypotheses 
about why changes occur.  Three profiles of coun-
tries that have had substantial changes in budget 
transparency are presented below and additional 
profiles can be found in the appendix to this report.
The initial investigation of what caused these 
changes suggests that a range of factors can lead 
to an increase in budget transparency.
ɆɆChanges in government. Improvement can occur 
after elections that result in a new government 
or the appointment of a new official commit-
ted to greater transparency. For example, in 
Ukraine a new finance minister changed a policy 
to require more documents to be published in 
order to improve discipline in the ministry, and 
in Azerbaijan a new head of the SAI made the 
national Audit Report public.
ɆɆInternal pressure. Budget transparency can 
increase due to pressure from within a coun-
try from legislatures and CSOs. For example, 
in Liberia legislators have been supporting 
demands for greater transparency, and in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo civil society 
groups have been successful in advocating for 
greater transparency.
ɆɆExternal pressure. Improvements in budget 
transparency can result from external pressure 
exerted by donors and from specific initia-
tives like the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative and the OBI. For example, in Angola 
and Mongolia pressure from international in-
stitutions and donors appears to have resulted 
in improvements in budget transparency, while 
in Malawi and Yemen, the Ministries of Finance 
may have begun to publish some budget reports 
when they realized that this could improve their 
scores on the OBI.
ɆɆTechnical assistance. Budget transparency 
improvements can be facilitated by technical 
assistance provided to countries. For example, 
experts from international development agencies 
or donor funding to support greater transpar-
ency helped advance public finance management 
reforms in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Rwanda.
“We recently organized a public event where 
we discussed the importance of government 
budgets to a group of women from a local 
community in astana. Initially, they seemed 
very skeptical about the issue and its relevance 
to their lives. Their young children were with 
them and we asked why their children were not 
in school. They replied that there was no space 
for their children in the local school. once we 
began to discuss the budgets for schools it 
became clear to the women why they needed 
to know how much money was being allocated 
towards schools and how budget transparency 
was such an important issue for them. 
—Janar	Janova	-	sange	research	Centre,	Kazakhstan
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three brief profiles  
of countries that  
increased transparency 
substantially
Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s OBI score increased from 8 in the 
2008 Survey to 21 in 2010, a jump of 13 points. 
This improvement is a result of the govern-
ment’s decision to publish budget documents 
not previously published, including the Mid-
Year Review and the Audit Report. Although 
the government’s decisions to publish these 
reports is a very positive development, the 
government’s continued failure to publish 
the most important budget document, the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal, ensures that the 
country’s OBI score remains low.
The improvements in budget transparency 
observed in Afghanistan can be attributed to 
the increased technical capacity of staff within 
the Ministry of Finance, as well as to the assis-
tance the country receives from international 
advisors and experts funded by international 
development agencies. The OBI 2008 found 
that the Afghan government produced many 
of the key budget documents but was not pub-
lishing them. After the results were published, 
the local OBI researcher held discussions with 
the Ministry of Finance to explain the OBI’s 
budget transparency criteria and encouraged 
the government to publish the budget data that 
they were already producing. These discussions 
may have contributed, at least in part, to the 
government’s decision to publish some reports 
that were not published earlier.
Since 2002 several donors have worked closely 
with the Ministry of Finance and provided 
technical assistance to help the government 
manage donor funds more effectively and in 
a more transparent manner. For instance, 
the government used the World Bank’s sup-
port to install and operate the Afghanistan 
Financial Management Information System. 
The Ministry of Finance has been using this 
financial management system on an ongoing 
basis to manage the core operating budget of 
the government and produce detailed monthly 
reports on the execution of the budget (which 
are made available online). While such im-
provements to the public finance management 
system have been ongoing during the past few 
years, the result of these efforts in the form of 
timely, comprehensive, and accessible budget 
reports has become visible more recently.
Further, at a donor conference in Kabul in July 
2010, the international community committed 
itself to channeling up to 50 percent of its assis-
tance through the Afghan government budget if 
they begin to meet certain conditions, including 
improving transparency mechanisms and reduc-
ing corruption during budget execution. In ad-
dition to its efforts to enhance the transparency 
of the government-funded budget, the Ministry 
of Finance is also making substantial efforts to 
enhance the transparency of the donor-funded 
external development budget (which comprises 
a significant share of public sector spending), 
through a development assistance database and 
an annual donor financial review.
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Liberia
Liberia’s score on the OBI increased from 3 in 
the 2008 Survey to 40 in 2010, a remarkable 
jump of 37 points. The improvements came 
about because the government published a 
number of documents it was not publishing ear-
lier, including the Executive’s Budget Proposal, 
In-Year Reports, the Mid-Year Review, and the 
Audit Report.
The improvements in Liberia’s OBI score were 
driven by a strong, deliberate reform effort after 
the formation of a new government in 2006 that 
led to major transitions, including within the 
Ministry of Finance. The changes also should 
be seen in the context of broader developments 
taking place in the country. First, in 2007 the 
government began to implement reforms in its 
public finance management systems, which are 
yielding results in the form of increased budget 
transparency. The reforms were prompted 
in part by the government’s desire to join the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative 
and benefit from debt cancellation. Liberia 
also wishes to attract more direct budgetary 
support from donors.
Second, the legislature in Liberia has been 
active in supporting budget transparency. In 
2008 the Liberian legislature enacted a Public 
Finance Management (PFM) Law that clarifies 
the budget system to be followed by the gov-
ernment. The legislature also approved a law 
that limits the amount of funds the executive 
can transfer from one administrative unit to 
another at its own discretion; large transfers 
from one administrative unit to another now 
require prior authorization from the legislature.
Third, the Liberian SAI has been exceptionally 
active in promoting budget transparency and 
accountability. The SAI has begun to publish 
its Audit Reports, as well as press releases on 
the Audit Reports, on the same day it submits 
these reports to the legislature. The SAI has also 
begun to distribute copies of its Audit Reports 
to civil society organizations and make them 
available in schools and public libraries. The 
SAI holds open forums in various provinces 
and invites communities to ask questions and 
provide suggestions. The SAI has established 
a hotline that people can call, and many of the 
SAI’s audits are undertaken in response to 
recommendations from the public.
The passage of the PFM law and the establish-
ment of the principle that budget documents 
should be published are very positive signs for 
the future of open budgets in Liberia. Liberia’s 
desire to attract direct budgetary support also 
is a clear incentive to maintain these achieve-
ments and make further progress. However, the 
precise direction and pace of future reforms 
will depend in part on the outcome of elections 
scheduled for 2011 and the commitment of 
the new administration to continued reforms.
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Mongolia
Mongolia’s score on the OBI doubled from 18 
in the 2006 Survey to 36 in 2008 and further 
increased by 24 points to 60 in the 2010 Survey. 
The remarkable improvement in Mongolia’s OBI 
score is primarily due to the fact that the govern-
ment began to publish budget documents that 
had previously not been available to the public, 
including the Executive’s Budget Proposal in 
2007 and the reintroduction of public Year-
End Reports in 2008. Moreover, between the 
2008 and 2010 Surveys, the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal was expanded from a 50-page docu-
ment to a 300-page document, thus providing 
more comprehensive information on revenues 
and expenditures. Additionally, the Mongolian 
SAI recently began making its Audit Reports 
available to the public on its new website.
These improvements are attributable to a 
combination of technical changes instituted 
by the government, the commitment of indi-
vidual public officials, including the Minister of 
Finance and head of the Budget Department, 
and pressure exerted by donors and civil so-
ciety. Budget reforms implemented since the 
mid-2000s have received technical or financial 
support from international partners, nota-
bly the World Bank, the IMF, and the Asian 
Development Bank. For example, the World 
Bank is implementing a governance assessment 
program at the Ministry of Finance, which has 
helped create fiscal information databases.
Some of the advances in budget transparency 
made by the Mongolian government have argu-
ably been “easy wins,” such as the publication 
of the Executive Budget Proposal, which was 
produced only for internal use prior to 2007, 
when the government began posting it on a 
government website. But given the erratic 
dissemination of such budget documents as 
the Year End Report and Audit Report, which 
were made available in 2004 but not again un-
til 2008, there is cause for concern about the 
sustainability of Mongolia’s achievements in 
budget transparency. This is heightened by the 
lack of legal requirements in the 2002 Public 
Sector Management and Finance Law, which 
requires disclosure of budget information to 
Parliament and other government bodies but 
does not specifically require dissemination to 
the public. Nor has Mongolia passed a Freedom 
of Information law despite intense domestic and 
international pressure since the early 2000s.
Passage of the proposed Integrated Budget bill, 
part of recent IMF conditions attached to aid, 
promises to redress the lack of legal require-
ments for public dissemination, as well as the 
absence of channels for public participation in 
the budget process.
Demands for greater access to information by 
citizens and civil society groups have played 
a critical role in enhancing transparency in 
Mongolia’s mining sector, which has become 
the main contributor to economic growth and 
an important source for government revenue. 
Despite the noted improvements in the level 
of transparency, Mongolian CSOs remain par-
ticularly concerned about the continuing lack 
of transparency in government procurement 
practices. 
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Changes in Documents Published: A Mixed 
Story Emerges
The overall number of budget documents that 
was published by the 78 countries covered in the 
2008 Survey for which data is comparable remains 
the same in the 2010 Survey. The 2008 and 2010 
Surveys both reported that these 78 countries 
cumulatively published 368 of the 624 documents 
whose availability was assessed.12
Some governments moved forward and have begun 
to produce and publish budget documents for the 
first time. For example, Afghanistan, Egypt, France, 
Liberia, and Zambia began to publish Mid-Year 
Reviews between 2008 and 2010.
However, some countries began to produce budget 
documents for the first time but are not publishing 
them. For instance, Liberia, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and Yemen have begun to produce Pre-Budget 
Statements but do not publish these documents.
Unfortunately, some countries took backward 
steps and their scores on the Open Budget Index 
declined between 2008 and 2010. Below we pro-
file two countries (Niger and Fiji), which stopped 
publishing some budget documents that were 
published in earlier years. As with the previous 
three case studies, these case studies are a result 
of preliminary discussions and hypotheses that 
will be tested further by the IBP through more 
rigorous studies in 8 to 10 countries.
Niger
Niger’s score on the OBI decreased from 26 in the 
OBI 2008 to 3 in the OBI 2010, a drop of 23 points. 
This drop can be primarily attributed to the lack of 
access to the Executive’s Budget Proposal during 
12 Similarly, the 2008 Survey reported that these 78 countries 
cumulatively produced 117 budget documents that they did not 
publish. The 2010 Survey finds that these 78 countries produced 107 
budget documents that they did not publish. Also, the 2008 Survey 
found that the remaining 139 budget documents were not produced 
by these 78 countries even for their internal use while the 2010 Survey 
finds that the remaining 149 budget documents were not produced.
the research period for the OBI 2010; further, the 
government also has not published its Year-End 
Report. At the time of the Open Budget Survey 
2008, these documents were available. Since Niger 
has not had a parliament since 2009 (when it was 
dissolved), the Executive’s Budget Proposal and 
the Year-End Report could not be approved by the 
legislature, and, without this approval, they could 
not be published.
Fiji
Fiji’s score on the OBI decreased from 13 in the 
2008 Survey to 0 in the 2010 Survey. This decline 
reflects the government’s decision to no longer 
publish a Pre-Budget Statement or a Year-End 
Report. Further, the national SAI is not publishing 
an Audit Report, which was previously published.
Fiji’s decline in the OBI can be attributed to the 
abrogation of the country’s constitution in April 
2009. Since that event, the government has also been 
heavily censoring the media and placing restric-
tions on the judiciary, thereby broadly curtailing 
the public’s access to information.
In addition to the declines noted in Fiji and Niger, 
seven governments that were found in the OBI 
2008 to have published Citizens Budgets have not 
published these documents in subsequent years.
These developments show the instability of budget 
transparency in some countries and are a caution-
ary note that hard-won gains in budget transpar-
ency cannot be taken for granted. Strong budget 
oversight systems depend on consistent publica-
tion of reports and civil society organizations and 
citizens need to be vigilant in ensuring that their 
governments do not regress in their commitment 
to budget transparency. •
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 chaptEr FOur: 
Strength of 
Oversight 
Institutions
Traditionally, budget processes have been dominated 
by the executive, specifically the finance ministry 
or treasury. Not only was very little information 
on budgets made public but the decision-making 
processes typically were also closed. However, 
the emergence of new public finance manage-
ment practices emphasizing greater openness in 
government budgeting practices and the need for 
strong oversight institutions have created systems 
in which three organs of the state — the executive, 
the legislature, and the SAI — have a formal role 
in the budget process. The reason these three 
organs exist in all modern public finance systems 
is to provide effective checks and balances and, 
thereby, ensure that funds are collected and spent 
in a manner that reflects national priorities and 
promotes development.
Typically, legislatures are required to approve 
the budget presented to them and are expected to 
hold government to account for its performance 
in executing the budget. A second agency, which 
may report to the legislature and assist it in con-
ducting oversight of the budget, is the SAI. SAIs 
check whether revenues are being collected and 
expenditures made by the executive in a manner 
that is consistent with the Enacted Budget and 
with applicable financial management regula-
tions. Generally, SAIs submit their Audit Reports 
to legislatures, which then may organize hearings 
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to discuss the findings contained in Audit Reports. 
Based on these hearings, legislatures may make 
recommendations to the executive for remedial 
action. Ideally, the legislature will then assess 
whether the executive has complied with these 
recommendations, thus closing the accountability 
loop.
In order to conduct effective oversight of budgets, 
legislatures and SAIs require legal — preferably 
constitutional — authorities specifying their func-
tions and the nature of their relationships to the 
executive. Legislatures and SAIs can be most effec-
tive when they have a combination of legal powers, 
research capacity, and comprehensive information 
on public finances.
The growth of civil society organizations in countries 
around the world that are analyzing and monitoring 
government budgets and their impact on the lives 
of citizens offers an opportunity for legislatures 
and SAIs to augment their oversight capacity. 
These civil society organizations can provide new 
information and analyses for use by legislatures 
and SAIs on how the executive is managing public 
funds. They also can help pressure the executive 
to take corrective action on problems identified 
by legislatures and SAIs.
The Open Budget Survey assesses the strength of 
legislatures and SAIs and opportunities for public 
engagement offered by these institutions. Findings 
from the Survey pertaining to these two entities 
are presented below.13
Strength of Legislatures
The Open Budget Survey measures legislative 
strength based on a number of criteria that assess 
the legal authority of the legislature to approve 
budgets at the start of the year and to approve any 
amendments made to the budget over the course 
of the fiscal year. Other criteria measure the length 
of time available to a legislature to discuss and 
approve a budget and the level of detail available 
in the proposed expenditure budget approved by 
a legislature. Further, the Open Budget Survey 
assesses the openness of budget discussions con-
ducted by the legislature, including the extent of 
the opportunities that individuals and civil society 
organizations have to testify at public hearings 
organized by the legislature and to be present 
during legislative hearings at which the executive 
testifies on its proposed budget.
In the 94 countries covered in the 2010 Survey, 
the average score for “strength of the legislature” 
is 44 out of 100. As shown in Table 8, only 16 of 
the 94 countries surveyed are considered to have 
strong legislatures, scoring 67 or more. A larger 
13 Five of 22 questions in the Open Budget Survey regarding the 
strength of legislatures and SAIs are also used to calculate the Open 
Budget Index.
Box 5. 
Audit origins
The term “audit” originates from the Latin 
word audire, meaning “to hear.” Audire in 
ancient Rome referred to the “hearing of 
accounts,” a process in which one official 
compared his records with those of another 
official. As many of the parties interested 
in the audit findings were illiterate, audits 
were presented orally.
Modern public finance systems require 
the existence of an entity to oversee public 
expenditures. Known generally as supreme 
audit institutions, they may have such names 
as Office of the Auditor General, Board of 
Audit, or Court of Accounts.
Definition of Audire is from Harper, 
Douglas, Online Etymology Dictionary. 
www.etymonline.com
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number, 35 countries, have weak legislatures, 
scoring 33 or less.
The Survey reveals that weakness in the legislature’s 
role can result from a number of factors. First, leg-
islatures may not have adequate time to review the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal. For example, in 22 of 
the 94 countries surveyed, legislatures receive the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal less than six weeks 
before the start of the budget year. International 
best practice calls for the budget to be presented 
at least three months prior to the start of the 
budget year, but this standard is met in only 47 of 
the countries surveyed. In other words, in half of 
the countries assessed by the 2010 Survey, the an-
nual budget is approved into law by the legislature 
without adequate time to review and debate the 
proposed budget.
Second, even though budgets are typically enacted 
into law on an annual basis by legislatures in each 
of the countries included in the 2010 Survey, in 
TaBle 8. 
Over One-thirD Of legiSlatureS fOunD tO 
Be weaK in the BuDget prOceSS
survey subscores
number of 
counTries counTries
strong
(suBscOres 67-100) 16
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Mali, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United States
ModerAte
(suBscOres 34-66) 43
Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, 
El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Liberia, Macedonia, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, Venezuela, Zambia
weAk
(suBscOres 0-33)
35
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Fiji, Iraq, Lebanon, Malaysia, Malawi, Morocco, Namibia, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, Romania, 
Saudi Arabia, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Sudan, Timór-
Leste, Tanzania, Turkey, Vietnam, Yemen
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33 countries legislatures either have very limited 
or no powers to amend the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal; in only 27 of the 94 countries surveyed 
do legislatures have unlimited powers to amend 
the budget presented to them.
Third, legislatures in the majority of countries 
surveyed are not adequately empowered to exer-
cise effective oversight of the implementation of 
the budget. This can create situations in which the 
executive arbitrarily changes the budget approved 
by the legislature. In 52 countries included in 
the 2010 Survey, legislatures do not have any op-
portunity to stop the movement of funds among 
administrative units before such deviations from 
the approved budget have been made. Further, in 
31 countries supplementary budgets are either not 
approved by the legislature at all or approved only 
after the funds contained in them have already 
been spent. Similarly, in 58 of the 94 countries 
surveyed, expenditures made from contingency 
funds (funds that are set aside for use in emergen-
cies) are either not submitted to the legislature for 
approval or such approval is sought only after the 
money has been spent by the executive. In all these 
circumstances, the executive can circumvent the 
enacted budget law, and the will of the legislature, 
in spending decisions it makes during the year.
Changes from Open Budget Survey 2008
The average score on legislative strength for the 
85 countries included in the Open Budget Survey 
2008 was 42.14 The average score for these same 
countries has gone up slightly to 44 in the Open 
Budget Survey 2010. Notable improvers include 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Mongolia, South Africa, and Sri Lanka — countries in 
which legislatures began to approve supplementary 
budgets or the movement of funds among admin-
istrative units during the budget year, or in which 
14 The data for questions on legislative and SAI strength are com-
parable across all 85 countries that were assessed in the 2008 and 
2010 Surveys. This is in contrast to the questions used to construct 
the Open Budget Index for which data is comparable for only 78 of 
the 85 countries (see Chapter Three).
legislatures began to conduct public hearings on 
the budget proposals they were considering. On the 
other hand, legislative strength declined in some 
countries, including Chad, El Salvador, Fiji, Nepal, 
and Romania — countries in which legislatures no 
longer organize public hearings on their budgets 
or in which legislatures have reduced their level of 
oversight over the budget execution phase.
Strength of SAIs
The Open Budget Survey’s measures of the strength 
of SAIs assess the level of independence of an SAI 
from an executive. Independence is measured based 
on such factors as the nature of the procedure for 
removing the head of the SAI and the level of discre-
tion provided in law to the SAI to audit whatever 
it wishes. Other criteria assess whether an SAI’s 
annual budget is adequate to enable it to meaning-
fully exercise its mandate and whether specialized 
staff is available within an SAI to audit the security 
sector. Further, SAI strength is graded on criteria 
that assess the timeliness of the release to the 
public of Audit Reports on the final expenditures of 
national departments, as well as the nature of the 
communication between the SAI and the public. 
Finally, the Survey assesses the comprehensiveness 
of legislative scrutiny of audits issued by the SAI, 
as well as the comprehensiveness of any follow-
up reports released by the executive, legislature, 
or the SAI on the steps taken by the executive to 
address audit recommendations indicating a need 
for remedial action.
The average score of the countries included in the 
2010 Survey on the strength of SAIs is 49. As shown 
in Table 9, only 24 of the 94 countries surveyed 
have strong SAIs while 32 countries have weak SAIs.
The Survey finds that the majority of SAIs are 
independent from the executive on at least some 
measures. For example, SAIs in 83 of the 94 coun-
tries surveyed have significant or full discretion in 
law to decide which audits to undertake during the 
year. Further, the heads of the SAIs in the major-
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ity of countries surveyed — 70 of the 94 — can be 
removed only by the legislature or the judiciary. Of 
course, in the 24 countries in which the executive 
can remove the head of the SAI without seeking 
final consent from the legislature or the judiciary, 
the SAIs may feel constrained from releasing Audit 
Reports that detail anything negative in the man-
agement of funds by the executive (i.e., the SAI’s 
employer).
The 2010 Survey finds that SAIs in many coun-
tries surveyed face more general problems that 
can compromise their ability to play an effective 
oversight role. For example, in 45 of the 94 coun-
tries surveyed, the annual budgets of the SAIs are 
less than the amounts they reportedly require to 
perform their oversight roles effectively; further, 
in 19 of these countries, the SAI’s budget is actually 
determined by the executive (which can limit the 
SAI’s ability to implement its audit agenda by set-
TaBle 9. 
Only One in fOur Sais fOunD tO Be StrOng
survey subscores
number of 
counTries counTries
strong
(suBscOres 67-100) 24
Bosnia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Italy, 
Macedonia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, United States
ModerAte
(suBscOres 34-66) 38
Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, China, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia
weAk
(suBscOres 0-33) 32
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, 
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Jordan, Lebanon, Malawi, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Papua 
New Guinea, São Tomé e Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Serbia, Sudan, Timór-Leste, Uganda, Yemen
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ting a budget limit for the institution that is below 
its requirements to function effectively).
Further, there are other measures used in the Open 
Budget Survey to assess SAI strength, particularly 
those measures that assess the openness of the SAI, 
on which the SAIs in the majority of countries score 
poorly. In 49 countries, Audit Reports are either 
not published at all or are published more than 
a year after the end of the budget year for which 
they were produced — thereby greatly reducing the 
opportunity for these reports to be used to compel 
corrective actions. Further, legislatures in many 
countries make limited use of the Audit Reports 
submitted to them by the SAIs. Thus, in 40 of the 94 
countries surveyed, legislatures do not scrutinize 
any Audit Reports or they scrutinize only a few.
Finally, in 70 countries, the public receives no 
report on how the executive has responded to 
recommendations for remedial action made in SAI 
Audit Reports. These findings are troubling in that 
they point to the lack of seriousness or adequate 
follow up on the part of the executive to engage 
with findings contained in Audit Reports, including 
those that recommend remedial action regarding 
the manner in which public funds are managed.
Changes from Open Budget Survey 2008
The average score on SAI strength for the 85 coun-
tries included in the Open Budget Survey 2008 was 
45. The average score for these same 85 countries 
has gone up slightly to 48 in the Open Budget Survey 
2010. Notable improvers include Afghanistan, Brazil, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kazakhstan, 
Liberia, Sudan, and Tanzania. In these countries, 
SAIs were able to exercise greater discretion in de-
termining their audit agenda than was found to be 
the case in previous survey rounds, SAIs improved 
the timeliness of the release of their Audit Reports, 
or SAIs conducted more comprehensive audits on 
national security budgets than was documented 
in previous survey rounds. On the other hand, 
SAI strength declined in some countries, includ-
Box 6. 
the obi and interna-
tional Standards for 
Supreme Audit  
institutions
The IBP’s suggestions for strengthening best 
practices in openness and accountability in 
SAIs were recently incorporated into the 
International Standards for Supreme Audit 
Institutions developed by the International 
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions. 
In keeping with the IBP’s recommendations, 
these standards encourage SAIs to be more 
transparent regarding their funding and 
the degree of their discretion to undertake 
audits. These standards also encourage SAIs 
to maintain formal mechanisms through 
which they can communicate to the public 
and engage the public in the audit process.
Source: International Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions, “Decisions on Comments 
Provided on the International Standards 
for Supreme Audit Institutions 20 and 21,” 
INTOSAI, 2009.
 “Some corrupted people just swallow these 
funds for their own profits and what is left for 
us is to only dream of better schools, education, 
and a better future.”
—Priyanka	Yadav	-	high	school	student	and	second	Place	in	the	2010	
south	asia	open	Budgets	essay	Competition	for	India
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ing the Dominican Republic and Fiji. The SAIs in 
these countries experienced reductions in their 
powers to determine their agendas; additionally, 
the timeliness of the release by these SAIs of their 
completed Audit Reports deteriorated.
Budget Transparency and Strength of Oversight 
Institutions
Countries that have low OBI scores also typically 
suffer from weak oversight institutions. Table 10 
shows that the 22 countries that were found in the 
2010 OBI to provide scant or no information on 
their budgets also had the lowest average scores on 
legislative strength and SAI strength. In contrast, 
the seven countries that score the highest on the 
OBI 2010 also have the highest average scores on 
legislative strength and SAI strength. Indeed, this 
correlation is displayed for all five categories of OBI 
scores. This finding seems logical since effective 
oversight requires access to comprehensive and 
timely information.
To look at this information in another way, 24 of the 
35 countries assessed as having weak legislatures 
in the Open Budget Survey 2010 provide minimal 
or scant budget information according to the OBI. 
Similarly, 23 of the 32 countries assessed as hav-
ing weak SAIs in the Survey are among the worst 
performers in the OBI.
The 2010 Survey also finds the majority of countries 
(59 of the 94 countries surveyed) have legislatures 
and SAIs that are either both strong or both weak. 
In the remaining 35 countries, one institution is 
stronger than the other. For example, the legis-
latures in Bosnia and Chile score as weak while 
their SAIs are considered strong. In contrast, the 
legislatures in Mali, Portugal, and Sri Lanka score 
“stronger” than the SAIs in these countries.
 
 
public participation  
in budget oversight  
Systems
“I believe good budgeting means putting money 
where the needs are. a transparent budget will 
help the people gauge and decide how their 
resources are best used to address the issues 
they face. The elements of an open budget 
system ensure an informed and meaningful 
debate — without information, people are 
excluded from the decision-making process.”
—	Khuuram	Irshad	–	open	Budget	survey	2010	researcher	from	the	
omar	asghar	Khan	development	Foundation,	Pakistan
Many legislatures and SAIs follow practices that 
do not enable public participation to the full extent 
that is possible, even given the current powers of 
these bodies.
Legislatures can usually decide their own rules and 
standing orders and use these powers to organize 
public hearings or invite experts from civil society 
to provide testimony during budget discussions. 
In fact, many countries’ constitutions explicitly 
enshrine the rights of legislatures to call indepen-
dent witnesses.
However, the 2010 Survey finds that legislatures 
are not typically open to the public, including the 
media, during their budget discussions. In 68 of the 
94 countries surveyed, legislatures do not organize 
any public hearings at which the public is given an 
opportunity to testify on the budgets of individual 
ministries. Further, in 35 countries included in the 
Survey, all legislative budget discussions involving 
the executive are closed meetings; the public is ex-
cluded altogether from observing these meetings, 
even if they are committee hearings, and no public 
record of the meetings is provided. In 36 countries, 
only a few such discussions are open to the public.
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TaBle 10. 
cOuntrieS that lacK BuDget tranSparency alSO 
Suffer frOm weaK OverSight inStitutiOnS
0 20 40 60 80 100
SCANT OR NO INFORMATION
(OBI SCORES 0-20)
MINIMAL
(OBI SCORES 21-40)
SOME
(OBI SCORES 41-60)
SIGNIFICANT
(OBI SCORES 61-80)
EXTENSIVE INFORMATION
(OBI SCORES 81-100)
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The 2010 Survey also finds that few SAIs have 
instituted strong consultative mechanisms that 
would enable the public to refer complaints and 
suggestions to their national SAIs. For example, in 
57 countries, SAIs maintain very few formal com-
munication mechanisms through which the public 
can make complaints or suggestions to inform the 
audit agenda or audits. This thwarts a potentially 
excellent source of information feedback on the 
operations of government programs. The lack 
of such consultative mechanisms is particularly 
prevalent in countries in which SAIs lack adequate 
powers and independence from the executive.
SAIs typically score much lower on questions in 
the Survey assessing the comprehensiveness of 
published Audit Reports than they do on questions 
assessing their independence. This gap is especially 
large for those countries scoring less than 60 on 
the OBI 2010. This suggests that SAIs, even given 
their institutional limitations, could publish more 
information in their audit reports. Public support 
and involvement in the work of SAIs can, in fact, 
augment the capacity of otherwise weak SAIs to 
pressure their executives to take remedial action 
based on audit findings.
Implication of These Findings
The Open Budget Survey 2010 finds that a signifi-
cant number of countries have weak legislatures 
and SAIs — more than a third of the legislatures 
and SAIs in the countries surveyed are found to 
be weak. Further, the Survey reveals that the ma-
jority of countries that implement poor budget 
transparency practices are also countries that tend 
to have weak oversight institutions. This means 
that in these countries, not only is the public un-
able to have any substantial understanding of, or 
impact on, the use of national resources but even 
formal oversight institutions are unable to have 
any decisive impact on how the executive raises 
and spends money in the country.
Countries that have reduced the role of their legis-
latures to rubberstamping budget reports or that 
have undermined the independence of SAIs are 
likely to suffer from poor governance.  When the 
national purse is in the hands of a small elite that is 
unaccountable to anyone else, it is likely that both 
budgets will be unwisely spent and corruption will 
be significant.  However, legislatures and SAIs do 
not need to wait for the executive to begin to ad-
dress the accountability deficit.  As illustrated in 
this chapter, these institutions can begin to take 
some immediate steps themselves to open budgets 
to greater public scrutiny and augment their own 
limited capacities to oversee budgets. •
 “all the beautiful hopes, aspirations, and dreams 
that I have for my future will crumble to dust if 
the money which ought to be spent for making 
me a well-educated, healthy, and competent 
citizen ends up in the bank accounts of those 
who have power.”
—Prarthana	Bhattarai	-	high	school	student	and	second	Place	in	
the	2010	south	asia	open	Budgets	essay	Competition	for	nepal
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chaptEr FivE: 
Recommendations
For each country surveyed, the IBP has prepared individual reports on their budget 
process, including recommendations on how they can open up their systems. These 
individual reports are the best starting point for those interested in what actions should 
be taken by a particular country. Here we put forward general recommendations.
1. Countries should make public all the docu-
ments they produce.
A stunning finding of this report is how frequently 
governments produce essential budget documents 
but use them for internal purposes only or for their 
donors. Specifically, the Survey found that 42 percent 
of the budget documents that governments fail to 
publish are in fact produced but are used exclu-
sively for internal purposes or donors. Low-scoring 
countries in particular could substantially improve 
their levels of budget transparency if they simply 
began to publish documents they already produce; 
the majority of budget documents produced by the 
worst scoring countries are not made public. Of 
further interest, all 22 countries that fail to release 
the Executive’s Budget Proposal to the public do 
produce this document for internal purposes.
The IBP recommends that countries make public all 
the budget documents they produce; the first thing 
they should do is post them on the government’s 
website. This simple step would require virtually 
no additional effort or cost by the governments 
involved, but would dramatically improve the 
openness of budgets in large parts of the world.
2. Budget documents should be widely avail-
able for free and on a timely basis.
As this study finds, all too often countries impede 
access to budget documents by charging large 
amounts for them or by not using available mecha-
nisms for permitting free access. Many documents 
are also released so late that their use is diminished.
It is relatively easy to make these documents widely 
available for free. Governments should publish 
budget information on government websites. Even 
though Internet downloading speeds and the costs 
of Internet access are challenges that limit use 
in many countries, by making information avail-
able on their websites, the government reduces 
any chance that individual officials will use their 
discretionary powers to provide arbitrary access 
to budget reports. Further, those governments 
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that have already begun to publish information on 
their websites can improve access to the reports 
by providing budget data in easily downloadable 
formats, working with civil society to make data 
formats more user-friendly, and developing an 
archive system containing budget reports from 
prior years.
Countries should also make hard copies of budget 
documents available in national and local libraries 
and in information desks maintained in govern-
ment offices.
Governments should increase the timeliness of 
the publication of budget reports. For instance, the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal should be published 
well in advance of the budget approval dates, so that 
adequate review and discussion are possible, and 
Year-End and Audit Reports should be published 
within six months of the end of the fiscal year, so 
that these reports can be most relevant.
3. Countries performing especially poorly on 
the OBI should work to meet certain minimum 
standards.
One of the most encouraging findings of the Open 
Budget Survey 2010 was the significant progress 
made by many countries that had scored poorly on 
earlier surveys. Consistent with our first recom-
mendation, these governments largely achieved 
these improvements by beginning to make avail-
able on their websites the budget reports that they 
previously produced but had made available only 
to internal government audiences or to donors.
Still, 22 countries in the OBI 2010 did score less 
than 20. These 22 countries are Algeria, Bolivia, 
Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, 
Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Honduras, Iraq, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé e 
Príncipe, Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Vietnam. 
All of these countries produce an Executive’s 
Budget Proposal, but 21 of them are not publish-
ing this document. Further, five countries in this 
category do not publish the Enacted Budget. So 
the two documents that explain what the govern-
ment proposed to do with the public’s resources 
and what it decided to do with those resources are 
generally not available.
Another 12 countries in the lowest-scoring category 
produce an Audit Report but do not publish these 
reports; two countries publish these reports more 
than two years after the end of the reporting period. 
Further, very few legislatures in countries that score 
less than 20 on the OBI 2010 organize public hear-
ings on their budget discussions. Legislatures in 
only two of these 22 countries invite some external 
testimony to be provided in open legislative hear-
ings organized during consideration of the national 
budget. The absence of Audit Reports and public 
hearings underscore the failure of low-scoring 
countries to recognize the importance of checks 
and balances in the budget process.
The IBP recommends that, at the very minimum, 
countries that currently provide scant or no bud-
get information publish their Executive’s Budget 
Proposal, Enacted Budget, and Audit Reports. The 
IBP also recommends that legislatures in these 
countries begin to organize public budget hearings 
prior to the legislature’s approval of the budget. 
The adoption of these basic steps can meaningfully 
enhance budget transparency and accountability 
in these countries.
The budget transparency practices in these coun-
tries are of greatest concern to the IBP. It will be 
monitoring developments in these countries’ 
budgeting practices even before the release of the 
next OBI and will report on their progress.
4. Countries providing minimal or some in-
formation should improve their performance 
on three key reports.
The study finds that 52 countries score between 21 
and 60 on the Open Budget Index 2010 and thus are 
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classified as providing minimal or some information 
on their budgets. Virtually all of these countries 
release their Executive’s Budget Proposal to the 
public, but these proposals are substantially less 
comprehensive than those of high-scoring countries.
 The Audit Reports they publish are also insuffi-
ciently comprehensive and about a third of these 
countries do not publish this key document. 
Typically these countries also fail to publish some 
of the other key budget documents, most notably, 
Mid-Year Reviews.
These countries should increase the comprehen-
siveness of the Executive’s Budget Proposal and 
empower their SAIs to publish comprehensive 
Audit Reports. All of these countries need to publish 
Audit Reports, and they also need to begin to pro-
duce and publish Mid-Year Reviews. Countries like 
India, Colombia, and Sri Lanka increased their OBI 
scores and moved up from the some information 
category to the significant information category 
by taking most of these steps.
The published budget documents should include 
information on the relationship between the govern-
ment’s budget and its policy and macroeconomic 
goals; on policies that are intended to directly ben-
efit the country’s most impoverished populations; 
on outputs and outcomes expected and achieved; 
and on certain fiscal activities outside the standard 
budget process that can have a major impact on the 
government’s ability to meet its fiscal and policy 
goals, including extra-budgetary funds, quasi-fiscal 
activities, and contingent liabilities.
5. The authority, independence, and capacity 
of budget oversight institutions should be 
strengthened. The voice of the public should 
be allowed as a complementary check and 
balance.
The study finds that countries that disclose little 
budget information typically suffer from weak over-
sight institutions. Legislatures often do not have 
adequate powers to amend the budget developed by 
the executive, and they are not provided sufficient 
time to comprehensively assess the Executive’s 
Budget Proposal before approving it into law. The 
executive branches of many governments also have 
the latitude to spend funds substantially as they 
wish regardless of what the enacted budget calls 
for. SAIs generally lack full independence from the 
executive and often report that they do not have 
sufficient resources to effectively undertake their 
audit mandates. These limitations in the formal 
oversight institutions severely compromise the 
accountability of the executive on public finances.
This study also found that government oversight 
bodies themselves often fail to provide opportuni-
ties for public participation. In only 26 countries, 
for example, is the public provided with formal 
opportunities to provide testimony during legisla-
tive budget discussions. In many countries these 
discussions are conducted in secret.
When all countries are considered, the average 
score for legislatures was just 44 and for SAIs was 
49, highlighting the general need for improvement.
Governments should recognize that opening up 
their budgets means strengthening oversight in-
stitutions, and the role of the public, as well. Even 
if information is provided by the executive branch, 
the absence of any meaningful checks and balances 
is a recipe for waste, misplaced priorities, and, 
sometimes, outright corruption. So legislatures 
should have amendment powers and time to review 
the budget, and they should be able to provide ap-
propriate checks if the executive desires to spend 
funds in ways that differ from allocations in the 
enacted budget. SAIs should be independent and 
have adequate authority, capacity, and resources 
to fulfill their oversight responsibilities. It also is 
worth noting that in certain countries recent im-
provements in how the executive branches present 
the budget were spurred by legislative pressure or 
strong SAI officials.
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The public also must be engaged in oversight 
processes. To promote effective public participa-
tion, the legislature should convene open public 
hearings at each stage of the budget process, and 
allow civil society and individuals to provide tes-
timony. Similarly, the public should be provided 
with opportunities to engage directly with SAIs 
in the evaluation phase of the budget process. 
There are many mechanisms through which such 
engagement can occur. For example, the U.S. and 
the U.K. maintain “fraud hotlines” through which 
the public can report suspected malfeasance in the 
use of public funds, while in South Korea the public 
can suggest subjects for potential audit.
6. Donors should encourage and support aid-
dependent countries to improve their budget 
transparency.
Countries dependent on aid receive significantly 
lower OBI 2010 scores than countries that are not 
dependent on aid. Among countries that receive 
donor aid that constitutes more than five percent 
of their gross national income, the average OBI 
score is 30. Among other countries, the average 
OBI score is 44. Other research has shown that 
in some instances donor practices inhibit budget 
transparency. Yet donors have both the interest (to 
see that their aid is well spent) and the influence 
to advance budget transparency (recent country 
improvements in opening up their budgets were 
often spurred by international pressure).
The IBP has prepared a country summary docu-
ment for each of the countries covered in the OBI 
2010, which can be found on the IBP’s website at 
www.openbudgetindex.org. Donors can use this 
information to identify the recommendations that 
the IBP offers to increase budget transparency in 
specific aid-dependent countries.
More generally, donors can encourage greater 
budget transparency through the use of a variety of 
carrots and sticks. They could create incentives to 
encourage improvements in budget transparency 
in the countries they support, including providing 
more on-budget support to countries that dem-
onstrate better budget transparency practices. 
Donors could also provide technical assistance to 
oversight institutions and actors (legislatures, SAIs, 
civil society, media, etc.) so that there is greater 
capacity to pressure executives to expand budget 
transparency and accountability.
Currently, governments that are willing to reform 
their budget systems have few options for receiv-
ing assistance and advice on budget transparency 
issues. Advice on transparency and accountability 
systems is often missing in current public finance 
management reform packages offered by donors 
and development institutions. Donors should, 
therefore, consider providing such assistance to 
willing governments. The IBP is piloting an initia-
tive to address this issue (see Box 7).
Finally, donors should make sure that information 
about their own aid is dealt with in a transparent 
manner. This can mean that any general aid they 
provide to a country is reflected in that country’s 
budget documents. It also can mean that donors 
report on their own project aid in a transparent 
manner, including, if possible, reporting on such 
aid in formats and timetables that are compatible 
with the recipient country’s budget systems.
7. A movement to push for a global norm on 
budget transparency should be established.
The overall improvement in budget transparency 
in recent years, as well as the significant improve-
ment experienced in many previously low-scoring 
countries, appears to stem, at least in part, from 
growing domestic and international pressure on 
governments to open up their budget processes, 
as well as from a better understanding of what 
good budget practices entail. Such pressure can 
be enhanced, and expectations can be further 
clarified, through the establishment and ratifica-
tion of a global norm on budget transparency and 
participation.
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On many key issues of global interest, various com-
binations of countries, international institutions, 
and civil society have agreed on a set of standards 
that they encourage countries to achieve over a 
period of time. For example, global norms around 
women’s political participation, ending torture, 
neutrality for medical personnel during war, and 
the elimination of landmines have each provided a 
tool for convincing governments to adopt policies 
that are in the interests of those unable to exercise 
power, and for holding governments accountable 
for implementing these policies.
The alarming state of budget transparency docu-
mented by successive rounds of the OBI consti-
tutes a compelling case for a major push from the 
international community — including legislatures, 
SAIs, and governments (especially those from Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America to ensure a representative 
coalition), donor governments and agencies, profes-
sional associations on public finance management, 
and civil society organizations — for a global norm 
on budget transparency. A budget transparency 
norm can codify broadly accepted principles and 
guidelines of appropriate government conduct with 
respect to transparency and public participation 
in the budget process. It is also important to note 
that the establishment and ratification of a global 
norm would provide civil society and legislatures 
with a powerful tool to leverage greater openness 
in their country’s budget systems.
Although there is already considerable con-
sensus within the international community 
around the importance of budget transparency, 
this consensus remains vague and incomplete. 
A global norm would provide comprehensive, 
well-defined objectives that the international 
community could work to achieve. Ideally, 
such a norm would identify key documents and 
procedures that must be included in any budget 
process in order for it to be considered trans-
parent. A norm should also help to clarify the 
central importance of public participation in 
any budget process that is to be considered truly 
transparent. This logic has yet to be fully re-
flected in the emerging international consensus; 
however, if the public does not have a real op-
portunity to inform the budget process, access 
to budget information will be less likely to lead 
to improved government effectiveness.
Going Forward
Citizens have the right to know how their funds 
are being collected and spent and what their gov-
ernments’ priorities are; the ongoing absence of 
budget transparency in most countries undermines 
this right. Further, building adequate checks and 
balances into the budget process, and making 
budgets transparent, can facilitate the equitable 
Box 7. 
the ibp provides 
technical Assistance to 
governments
In 2009 the IBP began a pilot program that is 
managed through its Mexico office to provide 
direct technical assistance to governments 
to help them establish systems that promote 
greater budget transparency.  The program 
provides national governments with experts, 
tools, and training and learning processes 
developed in countries that are at the leading 
edge of this work. 
The program is currently working with the 
Malian and El Salvadorian governments to 
develop Citizens Budgets.  These govern-
ments expressed an interest in and willing-
ness to participate in the pilot. More infor-
mation on this program can be accessed at 
http://www.internationalbudget.org/
what-we-do/mentoring-gov-program/.
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and efficient use of public funds, and diminish the 
extent of corruption.
It is our hope that this report sheds light on the state 
of budget transparency around the world today. 
It is our belief that adoption of the recommenda-
tions above would open up budgets further, help 
fulfill the right of citizens to know the priorities of 
their governments’ budget policies, and improve 
the collection and expenditure of public funds. •
appendIx a: 
why governments 
Change their practices 
on budget transparency
In its three successive applications of the Open 
Budget Survey, the IBP has identified changes 
in budget transparency practices in a number of 
countries. The majority of the countries in which 
changes have been recorded have improved their 
transparency practices, albeit marginally in some 
cases.
Understanding a government’s behavior and its 
motives for changing practices requires an in-depth 
study of the political economy (and likely other 
factors) in the country. The IBP is supporting the 
development of a set of comprehensive case studies 
in 8-10 countries that will attempt to place changes 
in these countries’ levels of budget transparency 
in each country’s broader political and economic 
contexts; these case studies are scheduled to be 
completed by 2011.
This appendix provides an initial review of changes 
in budget transparency practices in a selection of 
countries covered in the Open Budget Survey. (Other 
brief reviews are included in the main text.) Each 
country summary describes the major changes 
in budget transparency practices recorded by the 
Open Budget Surveys and briefly examines why 
these changes may have occurred. Open Budget 
Survey researchers in the select countries in which 
significant improvements in budget transparency 
were found provided their expert assessments on 
why these changes may have occurred; in most 
cases these opinions have been refined by an in-
dependent source in each country. The IBP also 
has made individual country summary reports 
for all 94 countries available on its website at 
www.openbudgetindex.org. These country sum-
maries provide a list of steps each country can 
take to sustain and continue to improve budget 
transparency practices.
Angola
Angola’s score on the OBI increased from 4 in the 
2008 Survey to 26 in the 2010 Survey, a jump of 22 
points. The primary reason for this improvement is 
the publication by the government of the Executive’s 
Budget Proposal; it was not published according to 
the earlier survey. Further, the published Year-End 
Report assessed for the 2010 Survey contains more 
comprehensive budget data than were provided in 
the Year-End Report assessed for the 2008 Survey.
The OBI researcher for Angola suggests that several 
factors may have led to the government’s deci-
sion to begin publishing the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal. First, the government faced pressure 
from international finance institutions and donors 
to improve budget transparency. Second, in the 
run-up to national elections in 2008, the govern-
ment wanted to present a more transparent image.
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Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan’s score on the OBI increased from 37 
in the 2008 Survey to 43 in the 2010 Survey, an 
increase of six points. This rise occurred because 
Azerbaijan began publishing In-Year Reports and 
Audit Reports for the first time; additionally, the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal now provides more 
program-level data than were provided in previ-
ous years. The government also began to publish 
more budget data on the websites of the Ministry 
of Finance, rather than making such data avail-
able only in hard copies that were available from 
the ministry or national libraries. Even though 
these positive changes are encouraging, concerns 
remain in the country about the transparency of the 
financial transfers from the State Oil Fund to the 
national budget, as well as about the limited role 
of the legislature in budget approval and oversight.
The local OBI researcher for Azerbaijan attributes 
the increase in the availability of budget data to 
four factors. First, legislators from the party in op-
position to the government became more vocal in 
demanding greater budget transparency from the 
government. Second, public finance management 
reforms introduced by the European Union’s Action 
Plan for Azerbaijan support greater access to bud-
get information. Third, the new head of the SAI in 
the country is committed to making Audit Reports 
publicly available. Finally, advocacy undertaken 
by civil society groups in the country demanding 
greater budget transparency is putting pressure 
on the government to release more information 
on its budget.
Bolivia
Bolivia’s score on the OBI increased from 7 in the 
2008 Survey to 13 in the 2010 Survey, a rise of six 
points. The 2010 OBI found that two key budget 
documents — In-Year Reports and Audit Reports 
— were available; however, they were scored as 
unavailable in the 2008 Survey. It is important to 
note that both of these documents are not published 
by the Ministry of Finance. The In-Year Reports 
are published by the Central Bank and, of course, 
Audit Reports are published by the SAI. Thus 
these minor improvements cannot be attributed 
to changes in practices of the Ministry of Finance.
In fact, IBP researchers continue to be concerned 
by the level of the availability of budget data from 
the Ministry of Finance, the agency primarily re-
sponsible for producing budget data. For example, 
the local OBI researcher in Bolivia was unable to 
access budget data pertaining to 2005. The govern-
ment claims to be updating this information more 
than four years after the end of that budget year.
Democratic Republic of Congo
The Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) score on 
the OBI increased from 1 in the 2008 Survey to 6 in 
the 2010 Survey, a shift of five points. However, with 
an OBI 2010 score of 6, the DRC continues to be one 
of the worst performers on budget transparency.
The improvement is a result of the publication 
by the government of two budget documents — a 
Citizens Budget and In-Year Reports — that were 
not published earlier. The government also be-
gan to publish a timetable for preparation of the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal. It should be noted that 
the government has now published the Executive’s 
Budget Proposal for 2010; however, this was done 
after the cut-off date used by the Open Budget 
Survey to assess the public availability of docu-
ments. If the government of the DRC continues 
to publish its Executive’s Budget Proposal, its 
score on subsequent applications of the OBI will 
increase significantly.
The local OBI researcher for DRC attributes im-
provements in the DRC’s budget transparency 
practices to debt cancellation negotiations cur-
rently being conducted between donors and the 
government under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative. One of the conditions under 
this Initiative is a requirement that the country 
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whose debt is cancelled needs to reform its public 
finances. Further, the government of the DRC has 
responded to calls from civil society for access to 
more budget data by publishing In-Year Reports 
and making more comprehensive budget data 
available in its Enacted Budget.
Malawi
Malawi’s score on the OBI increased from 28 in 
the 2008 Survey to 47 in the 2010 Survey, a jump 
of 19 points. These changes were a result of more 
comprehensive information being published in 
the Executive’s Budget Proposal, specifically more 
data on prior year budgets. Further, the govern-
ment began to publish a Year-End Report, which 
provides the public and civil society with more 
information for assessing how well the government 
implemented the budget. The OBI 2010 assessment 
for Malawi also used the central bank’s quarterly 
reports to assess questions in the Open Budget 
Questionnaire that pertain to in-year reporting. 
These reports were available in 2008 but had not 
been considered in that year’s assessment.
Even though budget transparency did improve 
substantially, concerns remain about the poor 
state of budget transparency overall and of the 
sustainability of the improvements achieved. The 
OBI 2010 found that the Malawian government 
still does not make the Enacted Budget publicly 
available. It also does not publish its budget docu-
ments on the website of the Ministry of Finance. 
The OBI researcher there was able to access hard 
copies of the Executive’s Budget Proposal and 
Year-End Report; he was not able to access the 
Enacted Budget in any form.
While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons why 
the government has made more budget information 
publicly available, the OBI researcher for Malawi 
suggests a few reasons behind the improvements. 
First, the government is responding to donor con-
cerns and mandated the Debt and Aid Division in 
the Ministry of Finance to more closely coordinate 
with donors and to publish more comprehensive 
information on foreign assistance. Second, the 
government is responding to budget transparency 
concerns profiled by the OBI 2008 and highlighted 
in the local media. An indicator of the Malawian 
government’s sensitivity to public pressure and 
scrutiny is that the Ministry of Finance recruited 
an external consultant to manage the agency’s 
public relations in 2008, specifically with donors. 
A summary of the budget was published as part of 
this process.
Rwanda
Rwanda’s score on the OBI increased from 1 in the 
2008 Survey to 11 in the 2010 Survey, a jump of 
10 points. During this period, the country began 
to publish several budget documents for the first 
time, including a Citizens Budget, a Pre-Budget 
Statement, a Year-End Report, and an Audit Report. 
However, the Executive’s Budget Proposal was not 
published before the budget was enacted into law. 
Further, even though Rwanda has now begun to 
publish four key budget reports, these documents 
do not contain much of the data assessed in the OBI.
Rwanda scored 1 on the OBI 2008 because the 
Rwandan government did not publish any of the 
eight key budget documents assessed by the Open 
Budget Survey prior to the cut-off date on which 
assessments leading to the OBI 2008 were com-
pleted (which was September 2007). Subsequently, 
the Rwandan government began to publish some 
of the eight key budget documents but because 
the assessment cut-off date had already passed, 
they could not be considered when the OBI 2008 
was compiled.
When the OBI 2008 was published, the results came 
as something of a shock to the government and its 
donors because Rwanda is considered by some to 
be a model for development in Africa. Since then, 
donors to Rwanda, as well as representatives from 
the Rwandan government, have approached the 
local OBI researcher and the IBP to discuss budget 
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transparency issues in the country and to identify 
ways by which the OBI score for the country can 
continue to be improved.
Since 2006 the Rwandan government has imple-
mented a number of reforms in its public finance 
management systems. In 2006 the country passed a 
law on state finances, a ministerial order on financial 
regulations was introduced in 2007, a manual on 
government financial management and reporting 
policies and procedures was developed in 2007, 
and a new chart of accounts for the budgets was 
adopted in 2008. These reforms have improved 
the government’s technical capacity to produce 
budget reports and made the government more 
comfortable about publishing these reports (previ-
ously, reports were produced but not published). 
Donors, led by the World Bank, have financed many 
of these reforms.
Ukraine
Ukraine’s score on the OBI rose from 55 in the 
2008 Survey to 62 in the 2010 Survey, a change of 
seven points. This improvement is a result of the 
publication of more comprehensive information 
in the Executive’s Budget Proposal. Further, the 
government has begun to publish In-Year Reports 
that meet international standards. It also now 
publishes an audited Year-End Report (earlier 
the government published an unaudited Year-End 
Report).
The government has changed its policy on the 
publication of In-Year Reports. Previously, the 
government did not want to publish data that it 
considered to be “preliminary” and, therefore, 
unreliable. However, the new finance minister 
changed this policy in order to improve discipline 
in the ministry. Further, the increased attention 
directed to the country’s economy as a result 
of the global economic recession prompted the 
government to provide additional information on 
its macroeconomic forecasts and policy goals in 
its Executive’s Budget Proposal. Importantly, the 
OBI 2010 found that the Ukrainian government 
no longer publishes a Citizens Budget as it did in 
2007. The publication of this document in 2007 
has been attributed to a one-off attempt by the 
then new finance minister (who was subsequently 
replaced) to be seen to be expanding transparency.
Yemen
Yemen’s score on the OBI more than doubled from 
10 in the 2008 Survey to 25 in the 2010 Survey, a 
gain of 15 points. This improvement results from 
the fact that in 2009, the government published a 
number of budget documents that it did not pre-
viously publish, including the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal and Year-End Report. When the OBI 
2008 results were published, Yemen’s Ministry 
of Finance expressed concerns at the country’s 
low score. The Ministry was also concerned about 
Yemen’s low score vis-à-vis some of its neighbors, 
particularly Egypt, which scored 43 on the OBI 
2008. The local OBI researcher for Yemen suggests 
that the Ministry of Finance began to publish the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal and other budget 
reports when it realized that it could improve 
its score on the OBI simply by publishing on its 
website documents it was already producing for 
internal use. •
“Many countries claim to have a democratic 
government. The ‘democracy’ is incomplete 
if the budget is not published and the public’s 
opinion is not taken into account while prepar-
ing the budget.”
—a.K.M.	sidratul	Montaha	-	high	school	student	and	Participant	in	the	
2010	south	asia	open	Budgets	essay	Competition	for	Bangladesh
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